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CREDIT MARKET REFORM IN THE
BUBBLE ERA
Aaron Unterman*
PART I: THE CREDIT CRISIS
Simply stated, the bright new financial system-for all
its talented participants, for all its rich rewards-has
failed the test of the market place.
Paul Volcker, April 8, 2008'
I. INTRODUCTION
August 2007 marked a turning point in economic history; in this
month, years of U.S. spending and credit excesses finally came back to
haunt the nation and financial world. In the period that followed, this credit
failure spread both geographically and amongst asset classes. Loss
calculations, which began at $80-billion, rose to $250-billion, then $400-
billion. In April of 2008, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF")
reported prospective losses at the $1-trillion mark.2 The economic bubble
* Member of the Financial Services department of Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not represent the views of the firm. The author would
like to thank Purdy Crawford, Peter Milligan, Rick Fullerton, Richard Borins, Harry Glasbeek, Paul
Vlaovic, Rael Levy, Ben Leith, Dana Hooker and Mahira Mohtashami for their insightful comments
and suggestions. A special thank you to my editor and fiance, Alisha Sevigny, for all her help and
support. The author welcomes any comments, questions or criticisms, email: aunterman@osler.com.
1. Martin Wolfe, Seven habits that finance regulators must acquire, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 7,
2008), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/ 0/a8d59dae-lbdl-1 I dd-9e58-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_
check=l ("Wolfe").
2. International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Containing Systemic Risks
and Restoring Financial Soundness, (April 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/
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precipitating this crisis was catalyzed by everything from consumer
behavior to government inaction: A culture of greed and fear dominated the
market.
Asset bubbles are not new phenomena, and in recent years they have
become a hallmark of developed economies. Frederic Mishkin of the
Federal Reserve describes their cyclical nature in the following passage:
Financial history reveals the following typical chain of events:
Because of either exuberant expectations about economic
prospects or structural changes in financial markets, a credit
boom begins, increasing the demand for some assets and thereby
raising their prices. The rise in asset values, in turn, encourages
further lending against these assets, increasing demand, and
hence their prices, even more. This feedback loop can generate
a bubble, and the bubble can cause credit standards to ease as
lenders become less concerned about the ability of the borrowers
to repay loans and instead rely on further appreciation of the
asset to shield themselves from losses.
3
In the current cycle, the credit boom centered on real estate, rapidly
driving up U.S. housing prices. Although bubbles are not unique in
financial history the magnitude of this one was with financial innovation
drastically magnifying the impact of rising asset prices. And nowhere was
this more evident than the now infamous U.S. subprime housing market.
Ground zero once the bubble burst this market's rise and fall was made
possible through a combination of both consumer and lender greed. Home
buyers borrowed money to purchase houses they couldn't afford, in the
naive hope that their investment would never stop appreciating. The risks
already inherent in such purchases were amplified by new mortgage
products requiring little or no down payment and permitting housing equity
to be withdrawn. Poor underwriting standards allowed mortgage lenders to
encourage these practices, and fraudulent and unethical behavior was
common place. As a result, losses in the subprime and related markets
have been severe and will continue. This crisis is not over. Until U.S. real
estate prices stop falling, the rate of foreclosures will climb unabated, and
the catastrophic unwinding of this credit and real estate cycle will continue
to devastate the U.S. economy. Furthermore, and importantly, the
aftershocks will be felt globally.
Much has been publicized regarding the failure of the U.S. mortgage
gfsr/2008/01/ index.htm ("IMF"). More recent predictions have reached the $2 trillion mark. See, e.g.,
RGE Monitor, Roubini Pegs Credit Related Losses at $2 trillion!, RGEMONITOR, Aug. 5, 2008,
http://www.rgemonitor.com.




market.4 Although this failure is fundamental to the current financial crisis,
the ensuing study will focus on the mechanisms which allowed this asset
class to infect all levels of the global economy. This paper aims to dissect
the financial infrastructure that managed to flourish on these shaky
foundations, will explain how a lack of or misguided regulation perpetuated
the crisis, and finally will explore what can be done to reform what is an
untenable economy driven by greed.
The first part of this paper examines the mechanisms of a secondary
market, which thrived on subprime mortgage lending, and deconstructs the
complex instruments which altered the global economy. Utilizing the
example of an apple farm, this section explores the journey from
securitization to CDO-squared examining both the mechanisms on which
this industry was built and those which led to its subsequent failure. Part I
concludes by examining the risks to the structured finance industry, and the
the broader economy, which threaten to intensify the current financial
crisis. Part II of this paper explores market, regulatory and legal reforms,
focusing on firm management, financial market reform and international
regulation. This part draws on the work of international governments and
regulators in formulating innovative plans for reform. This paper will
introduce novel and concrete measures required to reform the regulatory
structure of the international credit market, however, it will ultimately
come to the conclusion that a rethinking of the priorities and mentality of
our financial system is necessary to prevent continuous cycle of bubble and
burst. Financial markets have for too long been driven by greed and fear,
and sweeping changes to the global financial system are necessary to
reduce the deleterious effects of these all too human emotions.
A. BURSTING OF THE BUBBLE5
In the third week of July 2007, a development materialized which
foreshadowed the impending financial crisis. Over a billion dollars and
two collateralized debt obligation ("CDO") hedge funds belonging to one of
America's most revered financial institutions, evaporated.6 The first cracks
4. See, e.g., Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global implications of the Securitization of U.S.
Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS Bus. L. J. 77 ("Unterman").
5. Since the writing of this paper, the financial crisis has intensified drastically, most notably, this
intensification is evidenced by the nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the subsequent collapse of the entire investment banking industry and
severe drops in stock markets worldwide. The events which have occurred since the completion of this
paper have only reinforced its conclusions and therefore it has been left in its original form. However,
there have been relevant updates regarding the state of the financial crisis included where necessary.
6. Bear Steams High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Ltd. and Bear Steams
High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Master Fund Ltd. For further information,
Winter 2009
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
in the international financial market emerged on August 9, 2007, when BNP
Paribas SA, France's largest bank, was forced to stop withdrawals from three
investments funds because of their exposure to the U.S. subprime market.
The funds were subsequently closed due to the banks' inability to properly
value the underlying U.S. assets. The international governmental
community responded by flooding the market with liquidity, and central
banks injected over $136-billion into the banking system during that week.
On September 13, Britain witnessed a bank run on mortgage lender,
Northern Rock, which forced the Bank of England to intervene and
nationalize the institution. This was not to be the last bank run, nor would
it be the last government bailout. One month later in mid-October, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average reached an all-time high.7 This was a clear
sign of the investment world's detachment to reality as well as the peaking
of the asset bubble that drove economic growth during the preceding period
of unprecedented expansion. This stage of the global crisis culminated in
the failure of Bear Steams. The investment bank was bought by J.P.
Morgan for a fraction of its value, and only once the U.S. Federal Reserve
agreed to guarantee $29-billion dollars of Bear Steams' liabilities.8
As of August 2008, over $500-billion in losses have been reported,
primarily by major international banks.9 In addition to commercial banks,
the largest exposures to the U.S. subprime market are held by insurance
companies and hedge funds,' ° and greater losses and write downs can be
expected. Over one year after the initial crisis, there are no signs of it
abating and several indications the worst may be ahead."
B. THE CREDIT REVOLUTION
We have entered a new economic era where financial innovation is
replacing production as the engine of growth. In 2005, global financial
assets (including banking assets, stock market capitalization, and bond
market value) were calculated at US $165-trillion, a sum nearly four times
please see Bill Rochelle, Bear Steams, Bombay, Delphi, Calpine: Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 21,
2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=aTzL3qSvLMb8.
7. On October 9, 2007, the Dow peaked at 14,164.
8. Ryan J. Donmoyer, Bear Stearns Sale to JP Morgan to be probed by Senate, BLOOMBERG,
March 26, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=aAtuiqNFV2yE.
9. Eric Martin, US. Stocks Decline, Led By Fannie, Freddie; Hershey Retreats, BLOOMBERG,
Aug. 18, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=avj I rGtzl8Pl.
10. Insurance companies 23 percent; US commercial banks 18 percent; foreign commercial banks
12 percent; US hedge funds 17 percent. See David Greenlaw et al., Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the
Mortgage Market Meltdown, US Monetary Policy Forum Conference Draft, (Feb. 29, 2008), available
at http://www. chicagogsb.edu/usmpf/docs/usmpf2008confdrafl.pdf at 25 ("Greenlaw").
11. The solvency questions surrounding the Government Sponsored Entities, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, monoline insurers, and broker-dealers all suggest that the Bear Steams fiasco may be a
small part of a greater unwinding of the U.S. and global economy.
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the global GDP. More staggering is the notional value of derivatives 2 which
equal US $454.4-trillion, more than ten times the global GDP and three
times the size of all financial assets. Throughout this reshaping of the
international financial system, authorities remained on the sidelines,
trusting market forces and sophisticated institutions to maintain growth and
stability. This turned out to be a grave error, which has put the
international economy at risk.
The global credit explosion and subsequent crunch were the products
of a new era of credit risk transfer ("CRT"). Institutions mistakenly
believed that financial innovation had created a means to earn higher
returns and fees while incurring less risk. This fantasy was perpetuated by
the creation of a vast array of credit products, allowing for the tailoring of
credit exposure and appetite. CRT became a catalyst for the explosion of
structured finance ("SF"), a term which encompasses a wide range of
products from simple securitizations to much more complex financial
instruments. 13 SF offered a number of benefits to both originators of credit
receivables and investors. For originators, SF provides access to lower cost
financing than what was available based on their own credit rating, and has
the added bonus of detaching the risk of non-payment from the originator.
For investors, SF allowed access to highly rated securities (triple-A 1  rated
investments in particular) which offered relatively higher yields than
similarly rated products. It also offered investors the opportunity to
specifically tailor their desired risk exposures.
SF developed through the use of off-balance sheet instruments which
insulate investors from the threat of bankruptcy by an asset provider by
legally transferring assets to a bankruptcy remote entity, most commonly a
trust. This transfer reduced risk exposures and capital requirements of
institutions selling investments, 15 and also decreased disclosure and other
regulatory obligations. SF allowed risk to be dispersed to a diverse set of
investors and was credited with reducing the risk of financial shocks.
However, this dispersion of risk encouraged negligent lending practices
12. This includes interest rates, currency, commodity prices, credit defaults and equity price
swaps.
13. See The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market in Hearing Before
the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Entities, House
Committee on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 123 (2007) (statement of Joseph Mason) ("Mason").
14. Please note that reference made to "triple-A" means the highest available rating by each
rating agency for Moody's Aaa (long-term debt) P-I (Short-term debt), S&P AAA/A-I+, Fitch
AAA/FI.
15. Capital requirements under Basel I did not properly reflect the risks of off-balance sheet
instruments. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, The International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards, (July 1988) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc l .htm
("Basel I").
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and was not effective in transferring risk. 16
As we shall see the assumed benefits of financial innovation have
failed the test of the marketplace and caused a major systemic shock to the
international financial market. In the following section we will examine
the market dynamics which led to the spectacular rise and fall of the SF
market.
II. FROM SUBPRIME TO CDO-SQUARED
In order to comprehend events which have transpired in the credit
market, and predict those which will, it is necessary to understand how a
subprime loan can morph into a fundamental threat to the global economy.
The essential question which underlies the credit crisis is how loans to
individuals with poor credit histories (which often originated without credit
checks or down-payments) were transformed into investments that the
market trusted as being as reliable as government securities. Securitization
of U.S. subprime mortgages was widespread with almost three quarters of
recent originations finding their way into SF products. 17 Particularly hard
to fathom is that these loans that were driving record levels of foreclosures
were mostly part of investments receiving the highest credit rating
available. 18
To illustrate how the subprime market was transmitted into a global
economic liability and shed light on this complex industry we will go back
to a simpler time and consider the operation of an apple farm. As we make
the journey from innovation to absurdity, it will become clear the evolution
of the financial system into a fee-based bubble was designed in a way
which could not have been sustainable.
A. THE APPLE FARM-SECURITIZATION
After five years of perfect summers, the residents of Appleville had
reason to be optimistic about their crops. Apple production had increased
dramatically year after year and showed no signs of abating. Farmers were
16. Large accumulations of transferred credit risk found its way back to the balance sheets of the
largest and most reputable North American and European banks, creating unexpected write-downs and
losses. In addition to contractual obligations to provide liquidity support not being properly accounted
for, in many cases credit risks transferred by banks were re-assumed even though there was no
obligation to do so in order to preserve reputations.
17. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Credit Risk Transfer-Developments from 2005 to
2007-Consultative Document, (April 2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/jointl 8.htm ("BIS").
18. Eighty percent of subprime mortgages were funded by triple-A rated MBS senior tranches.
See IMF, supra note 2, at 59.
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becoming increasingly wealthy and everyone in town wanted in on the
boom. Although some of the wiser elders argued that the sunshine could
not last forever, their warnings went unheeded. Even the revered mayor of
the town believed the good times would never end, and stated publicly that
Appleville had entered a new era where the sun would never stop shining.
Apple production was big business and this attracted a host of
interested parties, including representatives of lB Farms from the big city,
who started making regular visits. What changed everything in Appleville
was a seemingly innocuous idea: IB Farms offered money up front for the
right to the apples from future crops. This seemed like a great idea for
everyone involved. Farmers like Joe were able to buy more land and
machinery without borrowing money at high rates from the local bank, and
IB was able to secure apples at a good price without the business risks
associated with running a smaller farm. With huge global apple demand,
IB Farms were easily able to resell these apples to supermarkets
worldwide. Any doubts about reliability which may have been held by
purchasers could be quickly allayed by the team of local weathermen who
were only to happy to evaluate crops and make assurances as to their
reliability (for a small fee of course).
The transaction described above is the basis of an asset securitization
with the apple trees representing the wealth-producing assets, 19 and future
apples produced by trees representing a source of wealth which can be sold.
Asset securitization is achieved through the establishment of what are
known as special 0urpose vehicles ("SPVs"), conduits and structured
investment vehicles. The crucial characteristics of these entities are
bankruptcy remoteness and off-balance sheet treatment. The former
characteristic ensures that creditors of a company whose receivables are
securitized cannot have recourse to those receivables in the case of
bankruptcy. For this reason the credit rating of a business whose
receivables are securitized does not determine its borrowing costs, allowing
institutions to raise capital at lower rates than what would be required
based on their own lower ratings.21 By selling the right to receive the
proceeds of future production, businesses can have access to cash
immediately and not shoulder the risk if these receivables do not
materialize. In the above example, the economic damage of a crop failure
would largely be borne by 1B Farms or any supermarkets which agreed to
take on such risk, depending on the agreement between the parties.
Because this risk is transferred, a higher rate of return is paid to the
19. In a securitization, the hypothetical apple trees would also be part of a collateral pool.
20. For the remainder of this paper these various off-balance sheet instruments will be referred to
as SPVs.
21. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the 2007-08 Liquidity and Credit Crunch, JOURNAL
OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 6, (May 19, 2008, forthcoming), available at http://www.princeton.edu/
-markus/research/papers/liquidity-crunch_2007_08.pdf("Brunnermeier).
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purchaser of the receivables. Furthermore in the event of a default,
investors can have recourse to the collateral held in the asset pool. In the
case of a home, this would allow the SPV to sell the property and realize
the proceeds for investors. For loan borrowers, securitization lowers
borrowing costs and makes funds more accessible. As a result
securitization was credited with allowing a broader base of society to have
access to credit.
The means by which most securitized assets were sold were as short
term notes in the asset-backed commercial paper market.23 The transfer of
repayment risk to off-balance sheet entities, such as SPVs created a
burgeoning shadow economy24 which was opaque to regulators and
investors. These entities were the source of fee-income and also allowed
financial institutions to expand loan portfolios through reduced capital
charges.
B. CROP RISKS-CREDIT PROTECTION
As with all investments, the IB Farms investment in future apple
production carried risks. The major concern was that of crop failure. A
fact of life in the apple farming business was that there were always a few
trees that did not make the production grade (not to mention the possibility
of disease, pests and drought). However, Farmer Joe, stressed the fact that
his trees had consistently grown bigger and healthier and rarely failed to
deliver fruit. But IB Farms did not get where they were by taking
unnecessary risks. In order to put up cash for future performance, they
required protection against the risk of crop failure. So to insulate their
investment Farmer Joe agreed to assume the loss of apples from the first
trees that failed to produce fruit. For added comfort, he also agreed to
reduce the expected crop haul to a lower rate than what he believed his
trees would produce. With the buffer of the first trees and the probable
inclusion of extra apples in the pool, lB Farms believed they had a win-win
situation. They had increased their future apple supply without taking any
material risks.
22. From auspicious beginnings the SF industry grew to fund approximately 70 percent of U.S.
consumer credit. Mason, supra note 13, at 123.
23. Asset-backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) is a security issued by a bank or other financial
entity with a maturity that is typically between 1 and 180 days. The notes are backed by the physical
assets that are used as collateral for loans to households or businesses. Because ABCP is backed by
underlying assets, the owner may seize and sell the collateral in case of default. The asset-backed
component of the commercial paper (CP) market has grown at a phenomenal clip in recent years, and at
the start of August 2007, accounted for more than one-half of the $2.2 trillion of all CP outstanding.
Greenlaw, supra note 10, at 6.




The techniques described above are designed to reduce the risk of loss
for 113 Farms, they are known in the securitization industry as credit
enhancements. Theoretically, any quality of receivables can be made into a
reliable investment with the appropriate amount of credit enhancement.25 The
most common means by which a pool of average receivables can ean0 the
triple-A rating is through subordination and over collateralization.
1. Subordination
In our example Farmer Joe agreed to assume any loss from the first
trees which failed to produce apples. In this way he has subordinated his
interests to IB Farms and any other investors. In a typical securitization
structure, investors agree to different degrees of risk exposure and
commensurate return, by investing in various segments known as tranches.
Those who purchase the most secure, senior positions, are said to be at the
top of the waterfall structure and are first to receive principle and interest
payments. Investors in the top tranches are insulated from loss by the
tranches below them and therefore bear less risk than holding a pro-rata
share of the underlying assets. In the above example Farmer Joe has
agreed to assume the most risky first loss position, which is referred to as
the equity tranche, and would be the first to loose apples if the crop did not
perform up to expectations. This tranche offers the highest rate of return,
but greatest risk of failure. Due to the lack of demand for these risky
investments, the equity tranche is often held by the issuer. In addition to
the equity and the most senior tranches, there are typically a number of
other tranches offering different risk exposure and return. As mentioned,
the equity tranche is the most junior tranche, subordinated by all others and
typically constitutes approximately 2 percent of a securitization structure.
The remaining tranches, which are subordinated by the senior notes and
ahead of the equity tranche, are known as the mezzanine tranches, and
formed the backbone of the CDO market. Because of market demand for
highly rated investments, securitizations are usually designed such that a
high percentage of the notes issued, approximately 80 percent are senior
triple-A rated notes. 6 Therefore in our example, investors in the most
25. For example, an agreement could be made establishing an account sufficient to cover all of
the expected receivables if they fail to materialize. If the collateral in such account is sound, then any
losses incurred by the underlying assets would be compensated, and there would be no risk of loss to
the investor.
26. In determining ratings, credit rating agencies ("CRAs") run stress tests to determine the level
of credit enhancement necessary to achieve a given rating. This process takes the form of a negotiation
between issuer and the CRA, in which the issuer can adjust the structure of the deal in order to achieve
a desired rating. For a triple-A rating to be achieved, a deal must be structured so that the lower rated
tranches incur all losses in a "worst case" scenario. For example, if a stress test determined that as a
worst case scenario 40 percent of the assets in a collateral pool would default and only a 50 percent
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highly rated segment of apple production would receive their apples unless
over 20 percent of the crop production failed to materialize.
2. Over Collateralization
Over collateralization is the amount by which a loan pool exceeds the
principle amount of securities issued. In the above example, Farmer Joe
has agreed to include less apples in his production pool than he expects his
trees to produce. Therefore, even if his expectations are not met, all the
apples he has promised to deliver may still be accounted for.
C. LIQUIDITY GUARANTEES AND CREDIT INSURANCE
The success of Farmer Joe's arrangement created a great deal of
interest with other local farmers as well as the large farms from the city.
Many similar deals were made, and before long almost every farmer in
Appleville had exchanged the rights to future crop production for cash. IB
Farms was unbelievably successful in selling future apples to supermarkets
worldwide and as soon as a deal was struck with a local farmer these
rights were sold almost immediately (with 1B farms making a tidy profit, of
course). In fact, with the development of this new apple industry, 1B Farms
rarely maintained an interest in the success of the underlying apple crops,
save their commitments to buy any apples for which short term demand
was not sufficient. Despite these supermarkets being the only parties who
maintained an interest in successful crop production, they did nothing to
monitor the state of the apple farms. Instead many relied on a new group
of market participants who entered the fray, offering to insure against the
risk of crop failure. In exchange for a regular fee these new insurers
promised to compensate for any shortfalls in Apple production. Some
townspeople queried where they would come up with these apples in the
case of widespread crop failures, but the supermarkets did not seem to care
and the business kept rolling as usual.
The forms of credit enhancement described above are liquidity
recovery rate on principal was achievable a 20 percent level of credit enhancement would be necessary
to achieve a triple-A rating. If a rating agency determines that the triple-A rating is not available to the
top tranche, an issuer can respond by adjusting the structure, shifting the required amount of principal
from the senior tranche to a lower tranche. In the above example, if the structure included only 18
percent credit enhancement, then the issuer would have to shift 2 percent of the senior tranche to a
lower tranche to receive a triple-A rating. For a more detailed analysis of securitization structures,
please see Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, Report on




support and bond insurance. The large farms agreement to buy apples in
case of shortfall in short-term demand, represents the establishment of a
liquidity agreement. The agreements provide a commitment on the part of
intermediaries to advance funds if there are no buyers for the short term
notes used to fund transactions. These agreements are common to
securitizations and ensured that a structure would continue to operate even if
notes could not be sold at the desired time.27 Committed liquidity facilities
were designed as a temporary source of funding, however, during the credit
crisis when the demand for commercial paper disappeared, banks were
forced to reacquire exposure to these investments.2 8 Bank liquidity facilities
are usually established with 364 day maturities to avoid capital charges and
are renewed each year.29 Furthermore there is currently no capital charge
for non-contractual liquidity support provided by banks to preserve
reputation.
30
The new parties described above who entered the market, selling
protection in the case of crop failure, represent bond insurers. Bond
insurance is similar to typical insurance, although it is not regulated in the
same way. These insurers, known as monolines, charged fees to guarantee
they would make payments if an SPV failed. However, unlike insurance
companies, which are required by law to keep capital reserves, monoline
insurers did not maintain appropriate reserves for their SF exposures.
Referring back to our example, when the time comes to make good on their
commitment to make up for shortfalls in apple production, it is unlikely
they would have sufficient fruit to do so. The monolines will be discussed
in greater depth when we examine threats to the credit market.
1. Summary
We have now canvassed the basic mechanisms that securitization
structures employ to increase the credit quality and rating of their
underlying assets. The upside of these various forms of credit
enhancements is that they transformed assets with lower ratings into highly
rated investments. This allowed these vehicles access to a vast store of
wealth; the institutional investor, allowing them to hold assets previously
27. Banks provide liquidity lines to ensure that note holders are repaid upon maturity if there are
funding shortages due to lack of demand. These lines of funding were meant to be temporary sources
of liquidity not means by which banks would replace investors.
28. An exception to this occurred in the Canadian ABCP paper market where unique general
market disruption liquidity lines were not advanced, leading to a frozen market of $32 billion in
commercial paper. Ongoing efforts are attempting to convert this short-term paper into medium or
long-term notes.
29. IMF, supra note 2, at 71.
30. Brunnermeier, supra note 21, at 5.
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prevented due to regulatory requirements. Institutional investors who were
only permitted to invest in triple-A rated securities were able to invest in
the senior tranches of securities backed by a collateral pool of lower rated
securities and earn higher rates of return. This was in many ways the secret
behind the SF boom.
D. DETERIORATION OF STANDARDS
Although supermarkets worldwide were buying up future apple
production with reckless abandon their representatives never visited
Appleville and showed no interest in the time honored techniques which
had made the town so successful. With all this money flying around,
farmers could pretty much guarantee they could sell the apples from any
newly planted tree before it had even started to produce fruit. Because of
perfect growing conditions and unconditional demand, some of the younger
farmers started disregarding the age old methods that had made Appleville
such a proud farming community. They started using less reliable seeds
and some were cutting corners on irrigation and pesticides. However, this
slip in quality did not bother apple purchasers, who either were not paying
attention, or were content to rely on the new credit enhancement
techniques which promised to secure their investments.
As with the apple farms, the high demand for assets used in SF led to
a deterioration in lending standards and the explosion of the U.S. subprime
mortgage market. A plethora of new exotic mortgages emerged which
enabled borrowers to buy houses they could not afford. Incorporating the
various forms of credit enhancements combined with the high rates of
home price appreciation, gave investors confidence that individual
underlying assets did not pose a significant danger to the structures. As it
turned out, these individually risky assets actually formed the majority of a
great deal of structures and they would not fare well in adverse conditions.
E. CREDIT RATING AGENCIES-THE WEATHERMEN
Although only briefly mentioned, the town's weathermen, also the
resident farmers almanac experts, played a key role in the apple boom.
Because of their long history and strong reputation, it became standard
practice to gain a weatherman's stamp of approval before completing a
sale. The detachment between the purchasers of apples and the farms led
to a reliance on weathermen for assurances that the weather would remain
good. With the advent of the new sales arrangements inspired by Farmer
Joe, the weathermen entered new territory and began giving advice on
Vol. 5:1
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crop production. This function unexpectedly gave them a crucial role in
the process and their unbridled optimism never failed to encourage the
investments which had made the apple orchards so prosperous. Relying on
methods which no one cared to investigate, weathermen would analyze a
crop's potential, as well as the various protections included in a sale and
issue a report to the local market. Because of their reputations and the
continuing success of the apple market, no one bothered to challenge their
evaluations and buyers worldwide seemed happy to blindly rely on them.
In reality there are three main institutions, Moody's, S&P, and Fitch,
who are the weathermen in the SF market. Because of regulatory
restrictions in the U.S., only select firms qualify as approved rating
agencies. 31 This designation allowed these firms to gain a de facto
regulatory monopoly and capture a 95 percent market share of the global
ratings business. 2 Moody's was one example of the success achieved by
these favored CRAs. Over five years ending in 2007, it was the third most
profitable company on the S&P 50033 and due in large part to the growth of
SF, Moody's revenues tripled since 2000.3 4 As of 2006, SF accounted for
54 percent of their rating revenues, with the largest contributions coming
from mortgage-backed securities and CDOs.35
CRAs were integral to the rise and fall of the SF market. Traditionally
banks play the role of credit monitor in the market because they have
access to the debtor's financial information. However, the transfer of risk
through SF shifted this role to different market participants who were less
acquainted with the underlying borrowers. CRAs provided a bridge
between traditional lending, to the era of CRT, and because agencies had
access to debtor information, they were relied upon (sometimes
exclusively) to evaluate the risk of default. However, these ratings have
turned out to be self-serving, allowing market participants (and the CRAs)
to earn profit and fees, while offering very little informational value about
risks. With the help of the CRAs, SF instruments were designed to attain
triple-A ratings to meet institutional investor criteria and tranches were
constructed to achieve this rating at the least expense. Ironically, it is the
31. These are designated as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations ("NRSROs").
In addition to Moody's Investors Services, S&P Standard & Poors and Fitch Ratings, they include AM
Best, DBRS, Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd. and Rating and Investment Information Inc.
32. This market share is divided as follows: Moody's 39 percent, S&P 40 percent, Fitch 16
percent. The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market in Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Entities, House Committee
on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 137 (Sept. 27, 2007), (statements of Julia Whitehead and Sean
Mathis) ("Whitehead").
33. Jesse Eisinger, Overrated, PORTFOLIO, Sept. 2007, http://www.portfolio.com/news-
markets/national-news/portfolio/2007/08/13/Moody-Ratings-Fiasco.
34. By 2006 Moody's structured finance revenues had exploded to $848-million from a mere
$50-million a decade ago. Moody's Corporation, Investor Day Presentation, (June 5, 2007).
35. Id.
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36triple-A tranches which have the greatest exposure to subprime mortgages.
Two themes of the credit crisis which have emerged clearly are that
CRAs were overwhelming failures when it came to evaluating SF risks and
that the market relied far to much on these erroneous ratings. The role and
failure of the CRAs in the SF market will be discussed in greater detail in
the second part of this paper addressing market reform. However, their
contribution to the credit crisis should not be underestimated and there is an
urgent need to align incentives within the industry to ensure they are a
positive force within the marketplace.
F. DERIVATIVES
What happened next in Appleville came as a shock to the town elders
who could be forgiven for labeling the practice "nothing more than
gambling on apples. " The same people offering money up front for future
apple production began entering into agreements to protect against the risk
of crop failures. It turned out that all types of businesses from the city were
only too willing to agree to replace any shortfalls in apple production
provided they were paid a regular fee. What began as an exercise in
prudence quickly spiraled out of control as people from the city (many of
whom had never seen an apple farm) started using these agreements to bet
on crop production. As with gambling, one bet usually leads into another.
This was no exception and before long more bets were being made than
apples produced. What had started out as a way of protecting against risk
quickly evolved into one big apple casino.
The apple casino represents the derivatives industry which allows
market participants to speculate on the probability of default of
corporations, securitization transactions, or any other entity which could
default on obligations.3 7  Credit default swaps ("CDS") are a derivative
instrument which allows a party known as the "protection seller" to acquire
the credit risk stemming from a debt, or class of debts, in exchange for an
annual fee from the counter-party known as the "protection buyer.3  The
debtor on the referenced obligation is usually not party to the swap, and in
36. It is estimated that approximately 80 percent of $1.4 trillion in subprime debt issued between
2005-2007 was transformed into triple-A rated securities. Greenlaw, supra note 10, at 17.
37. The 2003 International Swaps and Derivatives Association ("ISDA") definitions for credit
events include bankruptcy, restructuring, failure to pay, obligation acceleration, obligation default, and
Repudiation or Moratorium (for sovereign) (2003), available at http://www.isda.org.
38. According to the U.S. Second Circuit Court, a CDS can be defined as follows: "Simply put, a
credit default swap is a bilateral financial contract in which a protection buyer makes periodic payments
to the protection seller, in return for a contingent payment if a predefined credit event occurs in the
reference credit." Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d
168, 172 (2d Cir. 2004).
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most cases may be entirely unaware of the transaction. 39 The CDS industry
has played a large role in SF offering a means of hedging or gaining risk
exposure. They have also been incorporated into more complex SF
instruments like CDOs.
The once legendary former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan
Greenspan, espoused the virtues of credit derivatives, believing them
essential to the stability of the U.S. and global economy.40 Greenspan went
on to assert that the systemic benefits of the market were so important that
any regulation which might hinder market growth should be avoided.41 This
unregulated climate validated by Greenspan created perhaps the single most
prolific financial market growth in history. The end of 2007 saw the
notional amount of outstanding derivatives contracts reach $454.4-trillion,
with CDSs accounting for $62.2-trillion. 2 With regards to CDSs, the
outstanding contracts represent many multiples of the underlying corporate
bond market.43
CDSs are bilateral contracts traded over the counter and therefore not
subject to securities regulation. As a result the growth of the industry has
suffered from a serious lack of transparency and presents a number of
distinct risks to the international economy. According to the Bank for
International Settlements ("BIS"):
The effects of a severe market disruption, or the failure of a
major participant in the CDS or CDO markets, could now be
greater, and that there is a greater likelihood of transmission to
the credit market in general, or even more broadly to the real
economy.
44
There is also concern that regulatory arbitrages encourage risk transfer
to market participants subject to lower standards and regulation.4 ' The recent
explosion of hedge fund growth is connected to the CRT market with many
39. Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J.,
412 ("Lubben").
40. An example of the use of CDS to insulate lenders from risk can be taken from the Enron saga.
It is estimated that the banks financing Enron entered into over 800 swaps worth $8 billion to offset
their losses on the company's collapse. See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel Jr., Nineteenth Annual
Corporate Law Symposium: Debt as a Lever of Control: The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives,
75 U. CtN. L. REV. 1019, 7 ("Partnoy").
41. Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Risk Transfer and Financial Stability:
Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's Forty-first Annual
Conference on Bank Structure, (May 5, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/
Speeches/2005/20050505/default.htm.
42. These statistics were published by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association and
are available at http://www.isda.org/press/press04l608market.html.
43. In 2007 CDS contracts totalled $45 trillion while the value of the corporate bond market on
which these contracts were based only constituted $5 trillion. Brunnermeier, supra note 21, at 29.
44. BIS, supra note 17, at 26.
45. Id.
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specialist funds focusing on these activities. 46 It is estimated that they
represent approximately half of US trading volume in structured credit
markets. 47 Hedge funds can sell protection without including the liability
on their balance sheets48 and the role of leverage has further magnified
risks, with funds carrying leverage ratios approximately triple that of
commercial banks.49 This has raised the specter of triggering events,
causing serious liquidity problems.
The derivatives market, specifically CDSs, limit downside risk and
encourage banks to increase lending but reduces incentives to do so
responsibly. Creditors who have default protection may also lose incentive
to monitor debtors. Furthermore, there are cases where CRT shifts the
monitoring function to parties much less suited to the task. In the
conclusion of Part I potential risks posed by the derivatives market will be
more fully explored; in Part II industry reforms will be discussed.
G. CDOS
Just when the townspeople thought things could not get any more
bizarre, they did. With so much demand for future apple production, more
new products began to emerge. As discussed, investors were able to
choose the level of risk they were willing to accept and invest in loss
positions accordingly. In this way structures composed of tranches were
designed for the future receipt of apples. Because supermarkets were
unwilling to risk having empty shelves, there was less demand for apple
tranches more likely to fail, leaving a glut of these positions on the market.
Well, the finance gurus from the city had an answer to this too. Their plan
was to buy the lower rated apple tranches which were not selling, re-wrap
them in a new package, add some protections against failure and go to
market. Although the weatherman failed to appreciate what these new
products were, a hefty fee convinced them to give it their stamp of approval
and, accordingly, supermarkets actually bought these mutated investment!
46. Banks account for 40 percent of CDS written ($18.2 trillion notional exposure), hedge funds
sell 32 percent of all CDS ($14.5 trillion) with only approx $2.5 trillion under management. See
Compressing the $62 trillion CDS Market: Does a Reduction in the Notional Amount Ensure a
Reduction in Counterparty Risk?, RGEMONITOR, July 2, 2008,
http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini/ ("RGE").
47. Helen Avery, Hedge funds become the USfixed-income market, at 10, EUROMONEY, Sept.
2007, http://www.euromoney.com/Article/1422460/Category/14/ChannelPage/8959/Hedge-funds-become-
the-US-fixed-income-market.html.
48. Lubben, supra note 39, at 405.
49. According to calculations of David Greenlaw, hedge funds and brokers carry average
leverage ratios of 31.6:1. Commercial bank ratios are calculated to be 9.8:1. These calculation are
based on Flow of Funds, FDIC Statistics on Banking, and balance sheet data for Fannie Mae, Freddie




At this point our analogy becomes less than realistic as we enter the
realm of the CDO. In their simplest form, CDOs are re-securitizations
typically focused on the mezzanine tranches of established structures.
Investor preference for highly rated, higher yielding investments led to a
situation of abundant demand for triple-A rated tranches but a lack of
demand for lower rated tranches of securitizations. Mezzanine tranches 50 are
risky and less desirable for institutional investors and in 2003, U.S.
institutional investors stopped buying them.51  To keep the securitization
industry running it was necessary to transform these tranches into
something which could be sold. This led to the creation of CDOs
comprised of the riskier tranches of securitized assets. Through the
alchemy of SF this re-bundling still allowed the top 80 percent of the
capital structure to be rated triple-A.52 This magical transformation was
achieved in spite of the fact that the underlying securities belonged largely
to the lowest rated tranches of the original subprime securitizations. 53  By
the end of 2003, asset-backed security "ABS" CDOs 54 were comprised almost
entirely of subprime debt.55 Nonetheless, these lower rated tranches,
constructed with highly risky assets were re-securitized into triple-A rated
CDOs. This process was repeated with the lower rated tranches of CDOs
being recycled into what are known as CDOs-squared, which were created
to resecuritize MBS and CDO mezzanine tranches that were lacking in
investor demand. Even these highly risky instruments managed to achieve
50. As discussed, these are the tranches which lie between the senior and equity tranches and
usually constitute approximately 18 percent ofa securitization structure. They are typically rated AA+
to BBB-.
51. The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market in Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Entities, House Committee
on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 72 (2007) (statement of J. Kyle Bass) ("Bass").
52. Testifying before the U.S. House of Representatives, Julia Whitehead explained this
phenomenon as follows:
A variant on this tranching proved to be a major catalyst of the growth of the
structured finance market, and that was the use of CDOs specifically used to hold
lower rated or unrated tranches. Once the NRSROs attached investment grade ratings
to the bulk of a structured finance vehicle's securities, those issues were relatively
easy to place, particularly as hey tended to have a higher yield than comparable
corporate bonds. The lower grade or mezzanine debt were more problematic. In a
stroke of financial engineering genius, structurers devised the concept of creating
CDOs to hold all those issues that couldn't be sold otherwise. Through model magic,
a bunch of low-rated securities could be bound together with a little credit
enhancement and, again, mostly funded with triple-A debt. A problem with placing
the equity of that CDO? No problem. That's what CDOs-squared are for.
Whitehead, supra note 32, at 139.
53. Bass, supra note 51, at 72.
54. ABS CDOs are collateralised debt obligations backed by pools of asset-backed securities
including residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities (RMBS and CMBS) and other CDOs.
Most ABS CDOs are classified as cash flow or hybrid structures. Hybrid CDOs have exposure to fixed
income securities through both cash investments and, synthetically, through credit default swaps. BIS,
supra note 17, at 46.
55. Id. at 69.
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triple-A ratings for approximately 85 percent of their CDO tranches. 56
With this additional repackaging came a great deal of complexity,
however, lack of understanding by investors did not cause them to shy
away from these investments. The CDO market grew from approximately
$150-billion in 2000 to $1.2-trillion in 2007. 57  Investor demand for high
yielding CDOs was so strong that dealers managed to transfer more
subprime risk than was originated in 2005-06.58 In January 2006 the ABX
index was launched, this references a portfolio of CDS on twenty large
subprime RMBS transactions. The index was an immediate success,
attracting investors looking for exposure to the subprime market and short-
sellers betting on its demise. These investments became known as
synthetic CDOs, and found their way into complex financial instruments
worldwide.
What is now common knowledge is that the ratings assigned to CDOs
failed to take into account all the risks involved.59 The methodologies relied
on by the CRAs to rate CDOs resulted in these tranches being valued more
than the cost of the underlying assets. The price discrepancy was the source
of billions in fees earned for packaging, structuring and rating these
instruments. Although these incorrect ratings allowed institutional investors
to diversify investments and gain higher yields, it was not the assets which
provided the value. In a sense, the CRAs earned fees by issuing licenses,
allowing regulated investors to purchase investments which violated their
legal obligations. This gaming of credit rating requirements demonstrates a
malfunctioning of the financial system where the true value of an
investment was secondary to the triple-A rating. In fact, all three major
rating agencies have downgraded a significant number of triple-A CDOs to
CCC or lower.60  This downgrading phenomenon is evidence of a
staggering error considering that since 1970, Moody's had never
downgraded a triple-A corporate bond to lower than a single-A.61
The rise of the CDO resulted in high risk concentrations and an
eventual collapse of the market. There is still a great deal of systemic risk
associated with CDOs, including the fear that a default on one or more
highly referenced bonds could generate a chain reaction.62
56. IMF, supra note 2, at 59.
57. Id. at 56.
58. BIS, supra note 17, at 7.
59. A more realistic valuation of triple-A rated RMBS can be gleaned from credit spreads which
have priced them at similar levels to BBB-rated corporate bonds. Triple-A CDOs have suffered a far
worse fate and their market has almost entirely disappeared.
60. In October and early November 2007, Moody's downgraded 198 triple-A-rated ABS CDOs,
30 of which were downgrade 10 or more notches to below investment grade. Deutsche Bank Global
Securitization Research, Securitization Monthly, (December 2007), at 3.
61. BIS, supra note 17, at 14.
62. Partnoy, supra note 40, at 10.
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H. AND THEN THE RAINS CAME
Just as it appeared nothing could go wrong in Appleville, things did.
The farmers of Appleville who had for so long prided themselves on
integrity had let down their guard, allowing their standards to slip. They
had managed to get away with this because the weather had been,
unusually good. However, by the time the apple trade had become well
established things took a severe turn for the worse. There was no rain in
the spring, no sun in the summer and this, combined with poor growing and
maintenance standards, decimated the apple farms. Needless to say, with
all the money riding on the success of the crop, the damage spread far and
wide. The casino, which had once been a hub of excitement, closed its
doors. Trees died, people lost their farms and the shelves of supermarkets
were empty of the prized fruit on which this whole scheme was based.
This is what happened in the U.S., on a much larger scale, although it
was not rain but rather housing prices which fell, unraveling the entire
financial system. By April 2008, the innovative new financial system was
on the verge of collapse. Bear Steams, one of the twelve largest global
CRT counterparties, faced a crisis of confidence and imminent failure. It
was only through extraordinary government intervention that a systemic
financial crisis was averted (or postponed). A great deal of damage was
done to all levels of the economy and things will deteriorate further. The
CDO market, symbol of the height of the SF madness has been
decimated. 63 As of October 2007, 186 CDOs with $202-billion in assets
had failed, forty times more than all failures in the past four years
combined.64 Throughout 2007, Moody's downgraded 31 percent of all
ABS CDO it had rated. According to reports, 94 percent of mezzanine
ABS CDOs issued in 2006-7 will see their BBB tranche default, as will 45
percent of their junior triple-A tranche.65 Gross losses on ABS CDOs were
larger than actual losses on the subprime securities they held because these
instruments used derivatives to take on more lower grade subprime risk
than was actually issued.66
The unwinding of the SF market caused massive economic losses and
created systemic threats to the global economy. In the final section of Part
I, we explore some of these threats. The second part of this paper focuses
63. By November 25, 2007, about 9 percent of 2006-vintage and 14 percent of 2007-vintage,
S&P-rated, investment-grade CDO tranches had been downgraded, including about 5 percent of 2006-
vintage and 6 percent of 2007-vintage tranches initially rated triple-A. Similar rating actions have been
taken by Moody's and Fitch. BIS, supra note 17, at 47.
64. Mark Pittman and Jesse Westbrook, Asset-Backed Market Depreciates in SEC 'Scarlet Letter'
Drive, BLOOMBERG, June 10, 2008.
65. UBS Global Fixed Income Research, A Break in the Clouds?, (October 3, 2007).
66. BIS, supra note 16, at 11.
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on reforms for the global financial system. Without meaningful and
pervasive change, the decimation of the SF industry may be just another in
a long series of booms and busts.
I. WHERE THINGS WENT WRONG
The failures of the U.S. subprime market and the originate-to-
distribute model have been well-publicized. However, how this failure was
transmitted to a far broader market is more difficult to explain. In the
previous section, the mechanics of risk dispersion and the financial
instruments which incurred the bulk of the losses were examined through
the rise and fall of an innovative new apple farm. A number of more
general themes also contributed to the credit crisis.
First and foremost, the increased complexity introduced to the market,
combined with a decided lack of transparency, caused a high proportion of
skilled investors to make poor decisions. Financial institutions
overestimated their ability to disseminate values and comprehend risk.
This same lack of transparency and true understanding of the market led to
the knee-jerk reaction whereby investors fled and refused to invest when
the credit crisis struck. There was also a pervasive industry breakdown in
lending practices. By aggressively pursuing fees, market participants from
investment banks to rating agencies, were able to convert future income
into fees without maintaining risk exposure, leading to a failure in
underwriting standards.
III. FUTURE RISKS
After the bailout of Bear Steams, seven successive U.S. interest rate
cuts, the opening of the discount window to non-banks and acceptance of
non-conventional assets as collateral, and raising the lending limits of the
government sponsored mortgage industry giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac (the "GSEs"), a sense of cautious optimism returned to the market in
spring 2008. Although Bear Steams' rescue, along with these other pre-
emptive moves come at a steep cost to the taxpayer, there was a collective
sense that the risk of a major crisis had been averted. However, there is a
tremendous moral hazard associated with bailing out institutions who have
profited from excessive risk taking and as will be discussed in the second
part of this paper, without meaningful legal reforms the current cycle of
financial crises will continue and become more devastating. Reforms must
be forward looking as the nature of the next crisis will almost certainly be
different than what we are facing now.
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Unfortunately, we are not out of the woods yet. New cracks have
emerged in the U.S. economy indicating that the GSEs, as well as many
local and regional banks, will require government intervention.67 The U.S.
housing market, which served as the catalyst to the new era of finance,
remains in a dire state. As defaults in the housing markets continue, so too
will defaults in the markets which they derive from. Banks that are reeling
from huge losses, with billions more expected, will have to downsize their
operations and rethink their CRT business models. Along with the massive
losses incurred by financial institutions they have also lost one of their
largest sources of revenue. 68 The securitization economy which included
everything from subprime to CDOs, financial guarantors to ratings income,
will continue to suffer. Furthermore, there remain a number of legal and
economic risks to the financial system which could indicate that the credit
crisis was the beginning of a greater collapse.
A. THE REAL ESTATE MARKET
The U.S. housing market enjoyed an explosive and sustained period of
price appreciation which did not reflect market fundamentals. The housing
correction underway is severe, nationwide, and not restricted to the
subprime market. House prices are predicted to decline 18-20 percent from
their peak levels. 69 At the end of 2006, during the peak of the housing
boom, approximately 7 percent of U.S. mortgage holders had negative
equity.70 As U.S. house prices continue to collapse this statistic could
easily reach 20 percent or higher.71 Subprime and Alt-A mortgages
constituted over 30 percent of all mortgages originated in 2005 and 2006,
67. Since the writing of this paper, the two GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, failed and were
nationalized on September 7, 2008, and placed into a government-operated conservatorship. See
Rebecca Christie and John Brinsley, U.S. Takeover of Fannie, Freddie Offers 'Stopgap', BLOOMBERG,
Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=aWgUqhhCrYU. As of
October 11, 2008, 15 U.S. banks have failed, the most since 1993, and 117 banks have been placed on
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's "problem" watch list. See Alison Vekshin and Ian Katz,
Illinois, Michigan Banks Shut by Regulators; Toll Climbs to 15, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 11, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aqNGxkgoO5Hc.
68. Nouriel Roubini, How Will Financial Institutions Make Money Now That the Securitization
Food Chain Is Broken?, RGEMoNITOR, May 19, 2008, http://www.rgemonitor.com/roubini-monitor/
252638/.
69. As of May 2008, estimates of current declines are in the range of 10 percent. This means
there is a long way to go and that mortgage defaults will increase resulting in further damage to the
structured finance market. Map of Misery, THE ECONOMIST, at 81-82, (May 11, 2008), available at
http://www. economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story-id= 11333030.
70. Greenlaw, supra note 10, at 14 (citing statistics from First American CoreLogic).
71. Id. It is estimated that a 15 percent drop in national house prices would result in 21 percent of
U.S. home owners being underwater on their mortgage. This would have a tremendous economic
impact, resulting in approximately 10.5 million households and S2.6 trillion in mortgage put into a
situation where housing debt is greater than property value. Id.
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and by the end of 2006 represented approximately 15 percent of all
residential mortgages.7 2 The vast majority of these are adjustable rate
mortgages and this raises the specter of increasing rates of default as
mortgage rates reset higher and house prices fall further.7 3 Financial
predictions from the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum suggest foreclosure rates
of 13.5 percent on current outstanding mortgages in the coming years,
which represents $1.5-trillion in foreclosure starts. 4 Finally, the dire
financial state of the two GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, responsible
for the mortgage market, will require government intervention, at a
tremendous cost to tax payers. The U.S. subprime crisis precipitated the
global economic crisis and this market will continue to drag down the
economy and the SF instruments which they were created from.
B. COUNTERPARTY RISK AND DERIVATIVES
Perhaps the greatest systemic threat facing the global economy is
counterparty risk. As discussed, the derivatives market has grown to
astonishing heights without regulation or any true understanding of the
implications of this new economic phenomena. The interconnectedness
and massive scale of the risk transfer market has created a situation where
the failure of a major counterparty could have a domino effect.75
Counterparty risk is most acute in the CDS market and with the deeply
troubled monoline insurers. However, because of the vast scale of the
derivatives market, it also poses a grave risk to the global economy as a
whole.
Underwriters of SF credit risk, known as monoline insurers, continue
72. Id. at 15. Alt-A mortgages are loans that can be underwritten with lower or alternative
documentation than a full documentation mortgage loan but may also include other alternative product
features.
73. "By the end of 2006, subprime mortgages accounted for roughly 15 percent or $1.5 trillion of
the US residential mortgages, of which US $600 billion were originated in 2006. About 90 percent of
these were ARMs and borrowers were therefore hurt badly when interest rates began to rise in 2006."
Andrew Sheng, Chief Advisor, China Banking Regulatory Commission, Where to Go from Here:
Policy Panel, Tenth Annual International Banking Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Sep.
27-28, 2007, at 5, RGEMoNITOR, http://www.rgemonitor.com/redir.php?sid=l &tgid=0&cid=218272.
74. Greenlaw, supra note 10, at 22.
75. On September 16, 2008, in a striking turn of events, American International Group Inc.
("AIG"), the world's largest insurer, received a USD $85 billion bailout package from the U.S. Federal
Reserve. This bailout was undertaken to prevent a systemic collapse of the global financial system as
AIG is one of the largest global CRT counterparties. The Fed was forced to extend an additional USD
$37.8 billion on October 8, 2008, when it became clear that the original package, though huge, was not
adequate to satisfy AIG's counterparty obligations. Craig Torres, Fed Commercial Paper Holdings
Rose to $244.6 Billion, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.cornapps/news?pid
=newsarchive&sid=aZqyzOPzETE. This unprecedented government bailout demonstrates the U.S.
government's recognition of the devastating systemic implications of a major counterparty failure.
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to fight for their lives.7 6 These by-products of the credit revolution insure
$2.5-trillion of risk including approximately $800-billion in SF
Obligations.77
The counterparty to these trades are large banks, securities firms and
their off-balance sheet vehicles. Triple-A ratings are essential to the
business model of financial guarantors and although it was widely
recognized that these companies bore no hallmarks of this Rating, the
CRAs maintained them until late June 2008.78 The downgrades that ensued
may destroy monolines function in the SF market as their primary role was
to provide that extra nudge, and without this status they cannot insure
triple-A bonds. The monoline insurers are an excellent example of the
irrational exuberance that accompanied the credit boom. These companies
excelled in the business of insuring municipal bonds until they got mixed
up in guaranteeing CDOs through writing protection swaps. They also
signify the willful blindness of the industry. CRAs and regulators alike
continued to indulge their triple-A rating well after it became apparent they
were undeserved. The failure of these firms poses a significant threat to the
financial counterparties who relied on them for insurance and the CRT
market in general.
A second major source of counterparty risk is derived from the CDS
market. This market is believed to be a zero sum game with losses incurred
by protection sellers matching gains by protection buyers.79 However, there
is a tremendous concentration of risk within the CDS market, with the ten
largest participants accounting for nearly 90 percent of $45-trillion
outstanding notional CDS value in 2007.80 This concentration could lead to
a meltdown of the entire market if a major protection seller was unable to
meet its obligations. In the following section the effects of increasing
corporate defaults on the CDS market will be discussed.
An idiosyncratic concern arising from the CDS market has been the
assignment of swap positions, without notification to the counterparty. It is
well known that many CDSs were assigned to new counterparties without
consent.8  As one commentator describes; "It was a bit like lending money
to a friend who is really rich who in turn lends it to her deadbeat brother
and fails to mention it."'82 Recent examples, such as the legal battle
76. These include AMBAC, MBIA, FGIC and AIG.
77. IMF, supra note 2, at 78. "CRT makes up 20-30 percent of the average monoline's
portfolio." BIS, supra note 17, at 9. This figure is up from approximately 10 percent in 2005. Id.
78. Jennifer Ryan, Bank of England 'Worried' by Bond Insurer Downgrades, BLOOMBERG, June
26, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=ajfHAQ1NOAYk.
79. Although CDSs are treated as insurance in the restructuring of the Delphi Corporation,
protection buyers received 36.62 percent per contract not 100 percent. RGE, supra note 46.
80. IMF, supra note 2, at 17.
81. Jenny Anderson, Derivatives May Put the New York Fed Chief Through a Stress Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at CI, C4.
82. Id.
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between a major bank and a hedge fund group, highlight the dangers of
trading in the unregulated world of derivatives. The lawsuit centers on a
CDS which referenced one of the bank's subprime CDOs. The hedge fund
was contracted to act as a protection seller for the swap which insured
$1.31 -billion even though the firm had only $200-million in capital. After
a series of margin calls the Bank claimed that the notes had defaulted and
commenced litigation to recover their value.83 A series of similar cases
have emerged with the common theme of vastly undercapitalized sellers of
credit protection. Although the master International Swaps and Derivatives
Association ("ISDA") agreement requires counterparty consent, dealers
frequently accepted novations without evidence of such consent.84 The ISDA
Novation Protocol released in November 2005 has alleviated some of these
concerns by requiring that swap parties be informed on a timely basis when a
party wishes to transfer an existing trade to a new counterparty.85 Under
the protocol the party initiating novation must provide written confirmation
from the original counterparty or it will be deemed to have entered into a
new contract and the original contract will also stand.86  However, there
remain trillions in outstanding contracts whose reliability are far from
certain. The ability of smaller firms to make good on their protection
obligations reduces the value of hedges and will likely result in a large
number of failed hedge funds.
In the same way that the booming U.S. housing market allowed the SF
market to grow untested, the strong economic growth prior to the credit
crisis allowed the derivatives industry to grow exponentially without any
major stresses. However, as the global economy begins its decent into
recession we will have a chance to witness the durability of this new era of
CRT.
83. The dispute is between the Swiss investment bank UBS, and Paramax Capital, a group of
hedge funds. Gretchen Morgenson, First Comes the Swap. Then It's the Knives., N.Y. TIMES, at CI,
C7 (June 1, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/business/0lgret.html. A similar
example is the Structured Credit Company, a Dublin based venture, which sold CDS protection on $5
billion of credit risk to major financial institutions although the company had only $200-million in
capital. When the smoke cleared Structured Credit Companies trading partners received only five cents
on the dollar. Robert Cookson et al., Painful Lessons to Be Learnt for CDSs, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London Edition), at 39, (Jan. 11, 2008), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/lc74756e-bfb6-1 Idc-
8052-0000779fd2ac.html.
84. Patrick M. Parkinson, Deputy Director, Division of Research and Statistics, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Over-the-Counter Derivatives, Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance and Investment, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, United States Senate (July 9, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
testimony/parkinson20080709a.htm. ("Parkinson").
85. BIS, supra note 17, at 22.




Going forward, a major source of concern will be the ability of the
financial system to absorb corporate defaults. Default rates maintained
historically low levels throughout the real estate bubble due to strong
economic growth and rising asset prices. However, this benign economic
climate is gone and U.S. corporate defaults on high yield debt in January
2008 alone, roughly equaled defaults for all of 2007, with leveraged loan
defaults doubling the 2007 rate.87 Just as lending standards slipped in the
U.S. housing market, there is evidence of less stringent lending
requirements (known as covenant lite loans) in the corporate realm. These
loans which were especially prevalent in the leveraged buyout market, often
did not require borrowers to meet quarterly maintenance criteria.88 The increase
in covenant lite loans has likely allowed some companies to prolong their
existence, however, it is feared that this will significantly impact recovery
levels on insolvent companies. It has also been argued that covenant lite loans
may increase the risk of eventual default because they allow companies to
operate with less discipline.89
The increase in corporate defaults will be an important test of the
burgeoning CDS market. Historical rates of default on investment grade
and junk bonds is 1.25 percent and at this level $500-billion of CDS will be
triggered leading to possible losses of up to $250-billion after recovery for
sellers of credit protection.90 According to IMF analysis, hi h yield corporate
default rates could climb to the 9-12 percent range in 2008.9 At these rates
any cracks in the global derivatives market will become crevasses and it is
highly unlikely that all of the major counterparties would remain standing.
The risk of a concurrent default of a reference entity corporation, and the
seller of protection, could cause major upheavals in the market.
Corporations can have multiples of their outstanding debt wagered in the
CDS market and a large corporate default could threaten derivative
counterparties. If a corporation and seller of protection against that
corporation were to default simultaneously the underlying premise of risk
transfer through CDS is destroyed and instead becomes an exercise in risk
magnification.92
87. IMF, supra note 2, at 9.
88. Id., at 15.
89. IMF, supra note 2, at 10.
90. RGE, supra note 46, citing Bill Gross of PIMCO.
91. IMF, supra note 2, at 16.
92. According to bankruptcy expert Stephen Lubben:
In a credit default swap transaction, the protection buyer gives up the risk of default by
the debtor and takes on the risk of a concurrent default by both the protection seller
and the underlying debtor. While risk of mutual default is likely remote, especially
given the strong credit quality of many swap dealers, it is not unconceivable that a
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D. RESTRUCTURING RISKS
As we enter a recessionary period, the ability of the market to preserve
the value of troubled firms through restructurings is essential to the
economy. However, the explosion of CDS has changed the dynamics of
such arrangements. A recent report on derivatives, describes the situation
as follows:
One of the great strengths of the financial system has been its
capacity to organize and execute restructurings for troubled but
viable countries and companies. Such restructurings typically
occurred through groups of primary creditors having a major
financial interest in the outcome. To the extent such primary
creditors now use the credit default swap market to dispose of
their credit exposure, restructuring in the future may be much
more difficult.
93
A creditor of a company teetering on bankruptcy may behave differently if
they have purchased credit protection through a CDS. In fact, such a party may
have an incentive to push the company into bankruptcy to trigger the swap. If a
company defaults the swap holder may be entitled to a full payment even if it
recovers one hundred cents on the dollar. Therefore, CDS may increase the risk
of involuntary bankruptcy filings as maturity dates approach on outstanding
swaps.94 This disincentive to keep a troubled company operating could
undermine one of the fundamental motivations for successful restructurings. A
number of CRT investors, particularly synthetic CDO managers, interviewed by
the Bank For Intemational Settlements ("BIS") have stated that they have "no
expertise and no intention of participating in any restructurings." 95 The growth
of CRT makes it very difficult for creditor committees to determine the true
economic exposure of various stakeholders. It will be much more difficult to
predict the behaviour of competing creditors without requiring that petitioners
disclose their swap positions.9 The performance and effects of CDS in a
recessionary period are yet to be truly tested and restructurings are another area
which may be adversely affected.97
major corporate default could cause one or two financial institutions severe financial
distress.
Lubben, supra note 39, at 5.
93. Counter Party Risk Management & Policy Group II, Towards Greater Financial Stability: A
Private Sector Perspective 9 (July 27, 2005), available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/docs/
CRMPG-II.pdf.
94. Lubben, supra note 39, at 11.
95. BIS, supra note 17, at 20.
96. Lubben, supra note 39, at 11.
97. SF restructurings are further complicated by the fact that principal and interest may be




Misaligned incentives and a lack of deterrence in the finance industry
led to the excessive risk- taking and the failure of the SF market. A wave
of litigation promises to swell from the financial crisis which likely will not
subside for many years. The key players in the proliferation of SF have
been traditionally well insulated from legal sanctions. However, the
rulings which emerge may change the landscape and significantly raise
deterrence levels. There is a growing political tide against the wrongdoings
of the financial crisis. As the U.S. housing market continues to worsen,
leaving people without homes, and recession sets in leaving people without
jobs, there will be a backlash against the industry which created the crisis
and particularly the people who profited from it. Some U.S. and foreign
politicians have gone so far as to equate the investment industry to
organized criminals for their role in the crisis.98 On June 19, 2008, the FBI
arrested two former Bear Steams hedge fund managers for their roles in the
CDO market. These arrests came on the same day as FBI Director Robert
Meuller announced a national crackdown known as Operation Malicious
Mortgage which targeted mortgage fraud and has already led to over 400
arrests.
Civil law suits have been initiated against a wide range of players in
the SF industry. Not surprisingly subprime mortgage lenders were the first
targets of litigation, however, most of these lenders have shut down or filed
for bankruptcy and are effectively judgment proof.100 As of July 2008, at
least 132 subprime and SF related class action lawsuits have been initiated
in the U.S. Most of the major securities issuers are the subject of legal
claims which include basic securitization deals but are largely focused on
CDOs and derivative related products. The most interesting and potentially
significant issue raised by litigation is whether members of the finance
industry should be held liable for their risk-taking and subsequent massive
losses. On the one hand, it is all but certain that some members of the
industry were aware of the dangers posed by the subprime market, and the
proliferation of SF, and should have done more to protect investors. The
explosion of the subprime market and the highly risky mortgages that
prepayments leading to what is called "tranche warfare." Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial
Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV., Issue no. 2, 2008-9,
(forthcoming), at 22 ("Schwarcz"). Difficulties may also arise with SPV structures that do not allow
modifications without triggering the early release of collateral or violating legal requirements.
Whitehead, supra note 32, at 141.
98. Jody Shenn, Ohio Attorney General Targets Wall Street for Lending (May 15, 2007),
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=acQFkmOA57Ll.
99. Patricia Hurtado and Thom Wedlich, Ex-Bear Stearns Fund Managers Indicted for Fraud,
BLOOMBERG, June 19, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aUWyz
WYWGuFY&refer=home.
100. This is because they have no assets to satisfy a judgement against them.
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fuelled this growth was widely publicized. Similarly, the dangers of SF
and derivatives have also been thoroughly disseminated. For example,
Warren Buffet, perhaps the most well known and respected investor in the
world, stated in his 2002 Berkshire Shareholder's letter: "The derivatives
genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost
certainly multiply in variety and number until some event makes their
toxicity clear" Speaking on behalf of the company he goes on to state: "In
our view, however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction,
carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal."'' 1 The risks
associated with SF and subprime were apparent well before the credit crises
and it is difficult to understand why the industry failed to take action to
mitigate these risks. While it is tempting to accuse the sophisticated
financial institutions who spawned these industries of robbing the public, it
is these same institutions which have suffered the greatest share of losses.
It is difficult to reconcile the failures of these institutions with a sinister
scheme to defraud investors. However, it is also clear that far too many
members of the industry behaved extremely recklessly and greater
mechanisms of deterrence could have prevented at least some of the pain
being felt now.
The CRAs role in the credit crisis will be discussed in greater detail in
Part II, but a rethinking of their role in the market is also necessary. These
institutions are paid to detect and publicize credit risk. Although they are
highly compensated and benefit from a number of regulatory protections
they have been, to this point, protected by legal immunity even when their
failures are negligent. In the U.S., ratings are equated to opinions, and are
protected as free speech under the constitution, and although, they were
relied upon as proxy regulators they were not subject to professional
liability for their ratings. To this day CRAs have continued to apply
unrealistic and negligent ratings; it is only a matter of time before they are
forced to take responsibility for their actions.
The underlying issue which must be dealt with by the courts is
whether the various players in the SF market were truly ignorant of the
imminent demise of the industry. Even if it is found that they were, greater
deterrence to negligent behavior is clearly required and may be found in
more harsh treatment by the legal system. The cost of litigation and
successful legal actions will further deplete the capital reserves of many
companies hit hard by the crises.





In Part I we have examined the mechanisms and failures of the SF
industry and the risks that remain to the economy. Just as our hypothetical
apple industry collapsed under its own complexity, lack of regulation
combined with rapid financial innovation in the SF industry created a
fundamentally untenable market which was destined to fail. The second
part of this paper will explore what can be done to reform the finance




The combination of unregulated financial innovation and human greed
has and will continue to have devastating effects on the international
economy. With tremendous economic expansion due to a historic asset
bubble and a limitless appetite for consumer goods on the part of the U.S.
population-regulators allowed the financial market to operate unfettered,
earning financial institutions immense profit. When the financial crisis
struck, the same governments that sat idly while firms profited from
financial manipulation, came to the rescue of these irresponsible actors.
Government bailouts stand in stark opposition to the ideals of the market
system. The market rewards successful firms and punishes failed ones.
This is the survival of the fittest capitalist mentality which apparently
drives our competitive spirit to productive heights. Allowing major
institutions to profit from irresponsible financial dealings and then
intervening when they get in over their heads makes it too easy for these
firms to avoid the consequences of their actions. Morally, this action is
reprehensible because it bails out the same people responsible for this
crisis, inevitably with tax payer money, and has the effect of privatizing
profit and socializing loss. It is clear that our financial system has gone
astray and that significant market and regulatory responses are necessary to
remedy the situation to ensure it does not happen again. Reform must be
meaningful and pervasive. If regulators fail in their attempts to keep pace
with the rapidly evolving financial market, the benefits of financial
innovation will not justify the costs.
The attention of the international community has been focused upon
the causes and progression of the subprime crisis. A number of reports
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have recently been published at the international supervisory level by the
Financial Stability Forum ("FSF"), 10 2  International Organization of
Securities Commissions ("IOSCO") 10 3 and Basel Committee, at the private
industry level by the International Institute of Finance (PIIF")164 and various
financial institutions;10 5 and at the governmental level by the U.S. and UK,
among others. 10 6 The second part of this paper will draw on these reports
and a range of other commentary in an attempt to target those areas in most
dire need of reform, and propose remedies which could shift the global
financial system to a more sustainable track.
Meaningful co-ordination at the international level remains at an
embryonic stage; however, the current crisis has demonstrated its necessity
and may serve as the catalyst for greater development. In addition to
developing a stronger regulatory framework, a paradigm shift within the
financial industry must also occur. The capitalist mantra of "greed is good"
has proven to be economically unsustainable, and it is only through a
rethinking of the operation of financial markets that a viable global
economy can be created.
The culmination of rapid financial innovation and weak regulation has
been a crisis which threatens not only Wall Street but small towns
throughout the U.S. and the world. Furthermore, the bailouts that have
occurred and likely will continue to occur in order to prevent a financial
meltdown will have deep societal costs. Meaningful reform is necessary on
a wide range of fronts and proposals abound. This section will examine
three interrelated areas in need of reform; the management of financial
institutions; the regulation of financial markets; and rating agency reform.
The international and borderless nature of financial markets has been
clearly demonstrated by the credit crisis and it is essential that the
subsequent internationalization of its regulation be achieved. The
concluding section will examine international initiatives including Basel II,
the feasibility of an international lender of last resort, and the development
102. The Financial Stability Forum includes: The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the Committee on the
Global Financial System (CGFS), the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), the Joint
Forum, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the BIS, the ECB and the IMF are the
international organisations that are members of the Working Group in addition to national authorities.
Financial Stability Forum, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and
Institutional Resilience, (April 7, 2008), available at http://www.fsforum.org/publications/r_0804.pdf
("FSF").
103. IOSCO, supra note 26.
104. Institute of International Finance, Interim Report of the IlF Committee on Market Best
Practices, (April 2008), available at http://www.iasplus.com/crunch/0804iifbestpractices.pdf. ("IIF").
105. See, e.g., UBS, Shareholder Report on UBS Write-Downs, (April 18, 2008), available at
http://bigpicture.typepad.com/comments/files/080418ShareholderReport.pdf. ("UBS").
106. See Senior Supervisors Group, Leading-Practice Disclosures for Selected Exposures, (April




of an intergovernmental rating agency.
II. AREAS OF REFORM
A. THE MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The risk management failures which took place at the world's most
sophisticated and wealthy financial institutions is perhaps the most
shocking aspect of the credit crisis. Many people were guilty of selling
products they did not understand. Institutional investors and banks lacked
the sophistication to determine the risks they were exposing themselves to,
through the creation and purchase of SF products.'07 These firms often
relied heavily or exclusively on credit ratings for their risk analysis, a
practice which led to massive losses. The most extreme example of poor
risk management was the accumulation of a $7.2-billion loss by a mid-level
trader at Societe Generale.108 In what has become symbolic of the risk-
taking culture and utter lack of oversight within the financial industry,
Jerome Kerviel, managed to single-handedly accumulate this record loss
through bets involving complex financial products. While this is the most
stark example of failed risk management, heavy losses have been registered
by most institutions involved in SF.
The risks associated with the rapid innovation of the SF industry were
thoroughly misjudged, highlighting the need for greater analysis and a
more cautious approach to the development of new financial products.
Examples of risks which were not properly accounted for include
reputational and counterparty risks. Financial firms chose to support
off-balance sheet vehicles even when they were not contractually obliged
to do so, in order to preserve their reputations. Firms also neglected to
properly appraise counterparty risk, entering into hedges without
conducting due diligence and relying on inadequately capitalized firms.
These are only two of many examples highlighting the need for
sophisticated and thorough risk analysis. In addition to these two relatively
conventional risks the complexity of new products, CDOs in particular,
reached levels which left firms incapable of evaluating their quality.
However, as we have discussed, prudence did not carry the day in this
regard and according to a number of reports, firms were more concerned
with capturing a share of this market than understanding what they were
107. IOSCO, supra note 26, at 15.
108. Gregory Viscusi and Heather Smith, SocGen 's Kerviel Charged, Released From Custody,
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 28, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=
agfPk7BbTBLU.
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exposing themselves to. 109
A report published by one of the financial institutions suffering the largest
SF losses highlights the failure of the company's risk management and
governance functions with regards to CDOs. t 0 While traditional operations
of the company were subject to comprehensive risk management oversight, the
CDO trading desk operated under a different control mechanism, favoring
expansion and capturing market share over common sense. As with many
other firms the importance of gaining profit outweighed the very real risks of
loss, indicating severe imbalances within corporate culture.
A recent report issued by the Senior Supervisors Group ("SSG")
highlights the risk management practices which helped some firms avoid
the full brunt of the credit crisis and the failures which contributed to some
of history's largest losses."' 1 The study found that firms which effectively
shared information and adopted a comprehensive firm-wide approach to
risk management fared better during the crisis. Firms skeptical of SF
ratings developed in-house analysis expertise, and similarly were less
affected by the turmoil.11 2 However, many firms failed to appreciate the
risk concentrations which developed across business lines highlighting
their lack of cohesive communication and general oversight.
The insufficiency of firm wide risk management in the finance
industry reflects the slanted priorities which drive many market
participants. During periods of economic expansion, financial firm culture
aggressively promotes the pursuit of profit. The role of evaluating risk is
secondary and does not fit with the mantra of competitive spirit and rapid
financial innovation. In short, risk management was neglected, particularly
in the events leading up to the current crisis. While profits were pursued at
all costs, losses were not avoided although the net effect is the same.
Rethinking the role of risk management in corporate governance structures
is essential. All too regularly risk management is seen as an impediment to
109. It is argued that there was not sufficient incentive to encourage sellers of complex financial
instruments to fully understand these products. Sellers likely viewed the risk of loss as remote and felt
comfortable following the "herd of other bankers." Furthermore, employee turn over rates may have
reduced incentives with participants envisioning being in a new job when losses materialize. Schwarcz,
supra note 97, at 14.
110. $38 billion as of April 2008, according to the UBS Shareholder Report. UBS, supra note
105.
111. Senior Supervisors Group, Observations on Risk Management Practices during the Recent
Market Turbulence, (March 6, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/
banking/2008/SSGRiskMgt doc-final.pdf ("SSG"). The Senior Supervisors Group includes the
French Banking Commission, the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, the Swiss Federal
Banking Commission, the U.K. Financial Services Authority, and the U.S. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Office of the Comptroller of Currency, Securities
Exchange Commission. The study was based on information from eleven of the world's largest
banking and securities firms.
112. Id. at 3.
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lucrative strategies and large bonuses."' Rather than being perceived as a
hindrance, this function should be a central tenant of institutional strategy
and development. For risk management to assume a fundamental and
independent role in the operation of financial institutions, a Chief Risk
Officer ("CRO") position independent of the lines of business should be a
mandatory part of corporate governance structures. Such an officer should
have lines of contact and report directly to the CEO, as well as the risk
committee of the board of directors. In addition, the role of the risk
committee should be enhanced. The committee should have outside
independent advisors available for consulting and meetings should be held
on a regular basis. The failure of the SF market illustrates the importance
of all new or evolving financial products being thoroughly reviewed by the
CRO and the risk committee. Furthermore, risks associated with firm
employees' trading activities should be monitored and investing mandates
should be clarified and disseminated to the entire firm. Generally, firms
must adopt a more comprehensive and firm-wide approach to risk
management, evaluating all exposures with a particular emphasis on
interconnected risk variables.
There is also a question regarding whether sufficient deterrents are in
place to prevent the reckless behaviors witnessed in the SF market.
Perhaps more stringent standards of civil liability would serve to improve
the prudence of the financial industry. As we shall see in the following
section, risk management failures are intimately connected with employee
compensation, which is deeply misaligned with shareholder and long-term
firm interests.
III. COMPENSATION
A. FINANCE INDUSTRY COMPENSATION
The current incentive system in place in much of the financial industry
does not promote long-term growth and stability. It encourages high risk
behavior in search of short term gains; caution is not rewarded. Although a
skilled advisor should have foreseen the consequences of excesses
associated with the real estate bubble, there is no financial reward for
advising clients to keep their money on the sidelines. The traditional
conception of the financial industry as fiduciaries helping investors make
sound and sustainable investment decisions has been undermined. The
113. A recent report citing an undisclosed risk manager states that the investment industry often
views "[r]isk management as a speed bump on the way to a bonus." Frank Milne, Anatomy of the
Credit Crisis The role of Faulty Risk Management Systems, No. 269, C.D. HOWE INSTITUTE, at 7, (July
2008), available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_269.pdf.
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reality is the marketplace is composed of salespeople compensated based
on short-term goals. According to Martin Wolfe, Chief Economist of the
Financial Times:
In the name of properly aligning incentives, there are enormous
rewards for successful trades and for loan originators. The
mantra of aligning incentives seems to be lost in the failure to
impose symmetrical loses-or frequently any loss at all-when
failures ensue. 114
The distorted system of compensation at many financial institutions is
based on large bonuses to encourage high rates of business. This lets
members of the investment industry profit in good times but not share the
losses in bad times and encourages unchecked risk taking. The short-term
nature of the industry is such that the individuals and institutions who
marketed toxic CDOs received huge bonuses for doing so. At the end of
2007, when the financial crisis had become clear, people selling the
vehicles of this crisis still received record-setting bonuses. The Financial
Stability Forum ("FSF"), an organization of international regulators,
describes the situation as follows:
One of the striking features of recent events has been firms'
sizeable payouts to staff in areas in which the firms have
subsequently incurred very large losses as risks materialized.
Compensation arrangements have often encouraged
disproportionate risk-taking with insufficient regard to longer
term risk. 1
15
Even the 11F, the international voice for the finance industry, has
conceded that this system of compensation encourages extreme risk
taking. 16 The current incentive compensation model is clearly not in
alignment with shareholder interest and as the credit crisis exposed, it is not
geared toward long-term performance. The IIF has recommended that the
compensation should be closely related to protecting shareholders' interests
and long-term, firm-wide profitability.' 17 One obvious solution to these
perverse incentives is to compensate on the performance of investments,
not the amount of business done. A trader should not be rewarded for
selling or investing in toxic CDOs if they will be worthless a year later.
This could be accomplished by deferring incentive compensation and
awarding bonuses in the form of restricted stock required to be held for a
designated period.1 8 Alternatively, bonuses could be paid into cumulative
114. Wolfe, supra note 1.
115. FSF, supra note 102, at 20.
116. 11F, supra note 104, at 11.
117. Id. at 12.
118. Nouriel Roubini, Ten Fundamental Issues in Reforming Financial Regulation and
Supervision in a World of Financial Innovation and Globalization, March 31, 2008, RGEMoNITOR,
http://www.rgemonitor.com, at I ("Roubini").
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pools to be held for a medium term and fluctuate based on the success of
investments.1 19 Funds within such a bonus pool could also be used to pay
any damages which arise due to negligent investment advice or shareholder
losses. As a whole, incentives in the investment industry should be geared
towards long-term success and stability. Bonus heavy compensation
encourages risk taking and consideration should be given to increasing base
salaries, while reducing bonuses. Without a significant change in
mentality, the financial industry's blind pursuit of profit will continue, as
will the cycle of economic bubbles and subsequent failures.
IV. FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION
A. MARKET TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE
A properly functioning market requires a free flow of information for
participants to properly evaluate investments. Arthur Levitt, former
Chairman of the SEC explains; "[i]nformed investors, armed with accurate
information, ensure that market prices represent fair values. And fair
market prices, in turn, ensure that the markets perform their economic
function of efficiently allocating capital resources."' 120 However, financial
innovation has severely reduced transparency in the market while greatly
increasing the complexity of market instruments. Many SF instruments
reached such a level of complexity and opaqueness they created huge
information asymmetries and failures. The creators of these products either
failed to appreciate their risks or, as some commentators have speculated,
may have intentionally designed their financial products to be obscure as a
way of making profits."' 2  The fact that many of the instruments trade over
the counter 122 means that there is preciously little information pertaining to
the instruments and who is holding them. Likewise, many financial
institutions such as hedge funds have emerged in regulatory voids as major
market players adding to the opaqueness and uncertainty in the market.
Operating in the shadows offered great benefits to many firms but this
same lack of transparency has devastated market confidence, destroying the
value of institutions and their financial holdings.
119. Id.
120. The Bond Price Competition Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing Before Subcomm. on
Finance and Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Hon. Arthur Levitt).
121. Martin Neil Baily et al., The Great Credit Squeeze: How it Happened, How to Prevent
Another, BROOKINGS INST., (May 16, 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/
2008/-/medialFiles/rc/papers/2008/0516_credit-squeeze/0516_credit-squeeze.pdf, at 5 ("Baily").
122. Trading "over the counter" means that securities are not traded exchange but rather through
direct negotiation between buyers and sellers.
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The majority of complex financial instruments were issued via private
placements and it is these securities (without public disclosure) which
account for an overwhelming portion of market losses. The events of the
past year have raised questions regarding the competency of prospectus
exempt investors, known as sophisticated or accredited investors. Those SF
deals which were publicly traded and subject to disclosure requirements were
not as affected by the liquidity crisis. 123  However, even in public offerings
where the risks associated with the collapse of the subprime market were
largely disclosed, 124 the complexity of the documents describing these
instruments made this disclosure ineffective. Investors armed with
prospectuses clearly did not acquaint themselves sufficiently with the
details of the risks involved and some commentators believe that even with
full disclosure market participants were not able to comprehend the risks of
SF investment strategies.
125
Complexity must be reduced and information must become much
more accessible for the SF market to recover and operate in a sustainable
way. To begin, issuers of SF products should make all relevant
information publicly available so that investors and all CRAs are able to
better evaluate risks. 126 Data on underlying pools of assets and instruments
should be comprehensible and widely available in a timely fashion to the
market. In this regard there is growing support for the standardization of
structured product offering documentation.1  Creating uniformity would
allow investors to appraise products more easily and highlight any unusual
terms. 128 The IIF has suggested creating a one-page prospectus summary
of risk factors for various structured products. The expected benefits
would be to help investors to "identify key risk drivers, enabling them to
evaluate the risks of structured products; and second, it should provide
investment committees with reference points in addition to ratings that
could be used in investment mandates."1 9 In the failed CDO market, legal
documentation such as offering circulars, trustee reports, and liquidity
agreements are usually only available to dealers and a limited selection of
institutional investors. There is a growing consensus that all information
provided to rating agencies should be publicly disclosed at origination.
123. IOSCO, supra note 26, at 5,10.
124. According to Schwarcz, supra note 97, at 6, it is generally agreed that disclosure documents
for MBS, CDO, and ABS CDO complied with U.S. federal securities laws.
125. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/so]3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1008326. It should be further noted that anecdotal
evidence suggests many senior executives may not have fully understood CDOs and other complex
instruments.
126. Id. at 11.
127. The argument against standardization is that one of the virtues of structured finance products
is they can be precisely tailored to investor's risk objectives.




Furthermore, throughout the life of a deal reports should 3provide timely
and standardized information regarding CDO performance.
The Senior Supervisors Group ("SSG") has issued a report based on
interviews with twenty leading international financial institutions outlining
recommended disclosures for off-balance sheet and SF instruments. 31 As a
general requirement, the report recommends that all SPVs and funded
liquidity lines should be disclosed and the performance of off-balance sheet
instruments should be noted in the sponsor's financial statements. In
addition, an explanation should be provided as to when it may be necessary
for a sponsor to consolidate the SPVs' assets and liabilities back on to its
balance sheet. 32 As the current crisis revealed, off-balance sheet
instruments can become liabilities in times of stress. It follows then that
contingent liabilities owed to off-balance sheet vehicles must be understood
in order to appreciate the true obligations of financial institutions. With
regards to SPVs, the SSG recommends that underlying assets should be
identified and divided by collateral type; firms should identify total
exposures to CDOs and specify the risk profile of the tranches held.
Furthermore, where a CDOs underlying collateral is subprime mortgages,
this should be disclosed. Firm-wide exposures to subprime should also be
elucidated, including any interconnectedness which concentrates risk, and
sensitivities to changes in underlying assumptions should be demonstrated.
Finally, exposures which have been hedged should be identified and the
counterparty disclosed. This is particularly relevant to hedges with
financial guarantors and the notional amount of protection bought should
be identified.
At the international level the implementation of Basel 1133 should increase
transparency through supervisory review giving regulators greater means of
inspection and access to information. This is known as the "second pillar," and
requires higher standards of disclosure by financial institutions to ensure market
participants have an accurate picture of risk levels. However, until disclosure
becomes more uniform and comprehensible, the Basel requirements will not be
truly effective.
B. ORIGINATE-TO-DISTRIBUTE MODEL
Securitization and the resulting risk transfer resulted in extremely
130. BIS, supra note 17, at 19.
131. SSG, supra note 111, at 16.
132. 1OSCO, supra note 26, at 9.
133. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS, A REVISED
FRAMEWORK COMPREHENSIVE (2004, updated 2006) available at http://www.bis.org/publbcbs128.pdf
("Basel 11").
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inadequate monitoring of borrowers, as originators became detached from
risk of default. In the subprime market mortgage originators were able to
transfer all risk of loss, creating a misalignment of interests with investors.
Investors along the securitization chain made the mistake of accepting
financial innovation in lieu of assurance on an underlying borrower's
ability to pay. The future viability of the pure originate-to-distribute model
is unclear, as is the broker-dealer model of earning fees through the transfer
of credit risk. To cure the monitoring disincentives and irresponsible
lending practice which have emerged, comprehensive reform is necessary.
The IOSCO is developing "best practices" to ensure that originators and
sponsors apply the same diligence and risk management practices to assets
originated to transfer, as they would to those held on balance sheets.
34
These best practices have not yet been disclosed but a number of
alternatives do exist to correct this dysfunctional model.
First, in order to improve market incentives, loan originators and
financial intermediaries should be required to hold some of the most risky
segments of the securities they create. The requirement that originators
and/or intermediaries retain a portion of the lower tranches and incur first
losses provides greater incentives to ensure and monitor the quality of
assets. Although this practice does exist in the marketplace, it should
become uniform. Failure to assume first loss position would then signal to
investors the lower incentive to maintain underwriting and monitoring
standards. Another option is to ensure originators and intermediaries
maintain "skin in the game," legally requiring them to hold loans for a
period 13' before packaging them into SF. This would ensure loans are
seasoned as defaults often occur in the early stages of the borrowing cycle.
Although this may be costly to the industry, it would provide far greater
incentive to ensure sound underwriting practices.
A third proposal is to have originators or sponsors acquire a certification
of quality. 36 Although mortgage originators frequently provide assurances
through representations and warranties, they are expensive to enforce and are
of little comfort due to the demise of the subprime lending industry.'37 Such
certification could be provided through the development of private sector
organizations specializing in the analysis of asset quality. 1
38
The originate-to-distribute model contributed to the deterioration of
mortgage underwriting standards and subsequent subprime crisis in the
U.S. While it led to a weakening in lending standards, it did not succeed in
134. IOSCO, supra note 26, at 10.
135. Approximately two or three years.
136. Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, UTAH L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=I 113034.
137. Id.
138. As discussed, rating agencies currently provide de facto certification of securities; however,
their role in the market contributed to the disintegration of underwriting standards.
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distributing risk. In many cases, banks that transferred assets to off-balance
sheet instruments were forced to provide funding through legal
commitments or for reputational reasons. Increasing the capital
requirements to account for the true liabilities attached to off-balance sheet
entities would also reduce incentives for financial institutions to
accumulate debt obligations without undertaking proper due diligence. The
market has lost faith in the oiginate-to-distribute model and to restore
confidence originators must take meaningful steps to ensure the quality of
assets underlying SF products.
C. REGULATORY ARBITRAGE
A central feature of SF's development was the creation of off-balance
sheet instruments such as SPVs, which reduced the capital charges of
banks. However, sponsoring banks provided large credit enhancements
and guaranteed liquidity lines, continuing their economic exposure to these
instruments. This regulatory arbitrage allowed these banks to maintain
balance sheet risks without the capital requirements. The credit crisis
proclaimed that banks were not sheltered from these instruments. Much
greater emphasis must be placed on liquidity risks, with greater capital
buffers established. However, any regulatory responses that target banks
with increased capital and lending constraints may have the effect of
diverting finance to lesser regulated sectors. The lack of regulation of non-
bank financial institutions has encouraged the growth of alternative
financial intermediaries, such as broker-dealers and hedge funds. Without
rigorous oversight these institutions will continue to engage in risky
lending and highly leveraged investing. Furthermore, it has been noted that
hedge funds contribute directly to bank risk, as banks are forced to reduce
or eliminate covenants to compete with risky loans made by unregulated
funds.139
Society witnessed the importance of non-bank financial institutions to
the economy when the Federal Reserve intervened to pull broker-dealer
Bear Steams out of the mud. While central banks provide deposit
insurance and act as lenders of last resort to banks, traditionally these
backstops were not available to non-bank institutions. As a result they
were susceptible to bank runs and crises of liquidity. However, due to the
growing interconnectedness of financial markets and the prospect of a
financial meltdown, the Federal Reserve was forced to open public coffers
to prevent a run on non-bank financial institutions. This funding line
remains open and in late July 2008, the Federal Reserve announced it had
extended its emergency primary dealer credit facilities until January 2009
139. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 125, at 13.
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in response to market turmoil. 140  Clearly, non-bank institutions must be
regulated if they are going to be provided with public funds. Nouriel
Roubini, a leading economic commentator on the credit crisis, has
explained that:
[...] a comprehensive supervisory and regulatory regime that
covers both banks and non-banks would also allow better
monitoring and assessment of systemic financial risks that, at the
moment, are not properly supervised. Providing both
regulators/supervisors as well as investors with the reporting and
disclosure of information that allows an assessment of systemic
financial risks will be essential to have a sounder financial
system. 141
The evolution of the financial system has witnessed operations,
normally reserved for banks, undertaken by lightly regulated entities such
as broker-dealers and hedge funds. This has called into question the
wisdom of regulating institutions, as opposed to practices. The explosion
of these institutions has created potential for a systemic failure in this
sector. Lack of regulation has allowed these institutions to operate with
insufficient capital and liquidity cushions, making them susceptible to bank
runs. Both off-balance sheet instruments and non-bank financial
institutions should be governed by a regulatory scheme which reflects their
roles in the market.
D. OTC DERIVATIVES
The espoused virtue of the derivatives market was its ability to
disperse risk to a diverse set of investors well suited to handle it, thereby
reducing the likelihood of financial shocks. However, the explosion of
derivatives may have heightened systemic threats due to the concentration
of risk in a few main counterparties and the transfer of said risks to parties
like hedge funds, who didn't have the capacity, or capital, to contain them.
Since its inception, the derivatives market has had its critics and
demonstrated its dangers. The 1998 near failure of Long Term Capital
Management142 sent shockwaves around the world and gave a preview of
the dangers associated with the proliferation of the derivatives trade. The
striking collapse of Bear Stearns is the most recent reminder of the risk
140. Scott Lanman, Fed extends emergency lending programs until Jan. 30, July 30, 2008,
BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a24FlvmuaNpO.
141. Roubini, supra note 118, at 4.
142. LTCM was a large U.S. hedge fund, run by Nobel Prize winning economists that was bailed
out from imminent collapse due to fears over thousands of derivatives contracts the fund had entered
into. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (Random House, 2000).
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magnification potential of derivatives.
The major danger facing the derivatives world today is that of failed
CDS counterparties. The failure of a major protection seller would have a
devastating effect on the value of hedges, requiring potentially huge
balance sheet write-downs. Even more frightening is the prospect of a
reference entity (such as corporate debt referenced by a CDS) and a
protection seller failing simultaneously. As global economic conditions
deteriorate, defaults will rise, putting tremendous pressure on protection
sellers and the derivatives industry in general. The interconnectedness of
the CDS and larger derivatives industry is also a cause for concern. The
astounding $62-trillion dollar notional amount of CDSs outstanding is
modest in comparison to the $454.4-trillion of overall outstanding
derivatives and it is unclear what effect a failure in the CDS market would
have on the market as a whole.
In the booming SF market, players entered the CDS market, selling
protection they did not have the means to provide. One example, which
has become a major source of economic concern, are monoline insurers
who exposed themselves to huge CDS credit risk, without maintaining a
reasonable capital cushion to make good on their obligations. While the
future viability of these companies remains uncertain, if they are to survive,
bond insurers should be required to hold more capital and subject to closer
supervision of underwriting standards for new products. 143 The FSF has
called upon supervisors to strengthen capital and regulation of monolines;
however, these actions should be extended to all sellers of credit protection.
To reduce the risk of counterparty failure, swap providers must maintain
insurance industry style reserves. Furthermore, disclosure of swap
positions should be mandatory so market participants have some idea of the
exposures and risk counterparties face. For disclosure to be meaningful
there is also a need in the market for the development of private non-bank
firms to specialize in monitoring and assessing credit derivatives. 1  Finally,
imposing limits on counterparty risk exposures would encourage
diversification and limit the potential domino effect of the failure of a major
counterparty.
45
The derivatives market has grown to astonishing heights as a
self-regulating industry under the purview of the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association ("ISDA"). Representatives of the ISDA board of
directors 146 have collectively incurred billions in losses linked to the
143. Baily, supra note 121, at 9.
144. Partnoy, supra note 40, at 1051.
145. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 125, at 40.
146. Bear Steams, UBS, Citigroup, BNP Paribas, and Royal Bank of Scotland have
representatives on the 16 member Board and have suffered heavy losses due to the derivatives trading.
For a list of ISDA directors and officers please see http://www.isda.org.
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derivatives trade, a sign this self-regulating institution may not possess the
discipline to independently oversee the market. In fact, ISDA did not
preach restraint but rather encouraged the market to achieve unencumbered
growth. Regulation of this industry is essential to future economic
stability: there is no reason why derivative transactions should not be
governed by the same legislation as bonds and loans. This should include
the registration of transaction documentation published through a public
disclosure service. 147 There is no economic or policy reason for allowing
these transactions to be unregulated. The size, volatility and complexity of
the market demands immediate supervision.
The need to standardize derivative products and develop a central
clearing house for trades has been recognized by regulators and market
participants. Greater uniformity would allow the market to compare
instruments of similar nature and improve liquidity. The development of a
central clearing house will reduce counterparty risk by requiring
appropriate margin requirements and marked-to-market evaluation on a
daily basis.148 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, major derivative
market participants, and international supervisors, have all begun efforts to
improve the infrastructure of the OTC derivatives market, by developing a
clearing house for derivatives trades. 14 9 Chicago based Clearing Corporation
has been selected to act as the central counterparty for the OTC derivatives
market, and along with London based NYSE Euronext Liffe, has announced
plans to start guaranteeing credit default swaps trades. 150 Provided these firms
maintain adequate capital reserves, this should reduce uncertainty and the
systemic risk of a major counterparty failing. The plan is also intended to
increase standardization and automation of credit derivative trade
processing, and improve risk management oversight. Another crucial
proposal is to incorporate provisions for cash settlement into standard CDS
documentation. Physical settlement creates backlogs and market distortions
when counterparties are required to produce the defaulted securities they may
not possess.'15  Finally, extending infrastructure improvements to other OTC
147. Partnoy, supra note 40, at 1047.
148. Roubini, supra note 118, at 8.
149. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Statement Regarding June 9 Meeting on Over-the-
Counter Derivatives, (June 9, 2008), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/news/markets/
2008/ma080609.html.
150. Clearing Corp. plans to begin issue guarantees by September 2008, Shannon D. Harrington
& Oliver Biggadike, Fed, Banks Agree Default-Swap Changes to Reduce Systemic Risk, June 10, 2008,
BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/newspid=20601087&sid=asNCB5JkQOyE&refer=home.
See also Nandini Sukumar & Abigail Moses, NYSE Euronext Liffe to Guarantee Credit-Default Swaps,
July 7, 2008, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/newspid=newsarchive&sid=aOyUTGrhG6s0.
151. The bankruptcy filing of Delphi Automotive is an example of the perverse and unpredictable
effect derivatives can have on debt markets. The company had approximately $2 billion worth of bonds
on the market but a notional amount of outstanding derivatives of over S20 billion. The bankruptcy
filing actually increased the price of Delphi bonds as protection buyers rushed to buy bonds in order to
make physical settlement. Partnoy, supra note 40, at 7.
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derivatives will reduce the risk of a wider market breakdown.
It is, however, unclear who will regulate Clearing Corporation, a
currently defunct clearing house, in their capacity as central counterparty of
the global derivatives trade. If improperly managed such an institution
could concentrate risk, and it is essential that appropriate regulation and
risk management be implemented to ensure that a reliable infrastructure is
created. The nature of the parties involved also raise serious questions as
to the impartiality which can be expected from a clearing house owned by
the same financial institutions dominating derivatives trading. Without
significant oversight and transparency there is potential for market
manipulation and anti-competitive behavior.
The derivatives industry has proliferated even as the global credit
markets have entered a serious downturn. Allowing this growth to
continue unchecked poses an unacceptable risk to the world market and
urgent action is needed to reign in this massive industry.
V. RATING AGENCIES
A. INTRODUCTION
At the epicenter of the credit crisis lie the CRAs. Through a
regulatory monopoly and de facto regulator status, these firms were relied
upon for their stamp of approval in the evaluation of the SF markets. It
was their triple-A ratings that facilitated the finance industry's willful
blindness to the threats posed by subprime and multitude of related
financial instruments. Credit ratings had tremendous influence on the
valuation and liquidity of SF instruments, particularly those linked to the
subprime market, 52 but did not succeed in providing accurate information.
The failure of rating agencies to provide appropriate ratings is
overwhelming, exemplified by the wave of downgrades described in Part I,
the inappropriate assumptions of permanent exponential housing market
growth, and until recently, the continued triple-A rating of monoline
insurers. A recent investigation undertaken by the SEC uncovered, not
surprisingly, a wide range of conflicts. There was evidence uncovered that
rating agencies were aware of the impending devastation of the CDO
market but failed to disclose this or adjust their ratings in a timely
fashion. 5 3 However, just as significant is the investment industry's lack of
152. IOSCO, The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Structured Finance Markets, 2 (May 2008),
available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD270.pdf.
153. For example, an internal CRA e-mail uncovered by the SEC stated that the rating agencies
"continue to create an even bigger monster-the CDO market. Let's hope we are all wealthy and
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due diligence and their willingness to rely on the triple-A rating in the face
of clear evidence to the contrary.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect is the industry, state and
international sanctions they have been afforded. Institutional and
government regulations have long used CRA ratings to create investment
restrictions. Under Basel II, CRA can be considered External Credit
Assessment Institutions, allowing regulated entities such as banks, to rely
on their ratings instead of assessing the risks themselves. 154  By granting
triple-A status to an investment, CRAs determine who invests in a security
and at what rate of return. The growth of SF is intrinsically linked to CRAs
being granted the power to choose what investors could invest in.
However, the ratings industry, in its current form, does not merit the
semi-official role they are granted in Basel II, by governments worldwide,
and the investment decisions of asset managers. This unchecked power
combined with the overwhelming failure of the ratings industry
demonstrates a clear need for significant reform, if not a total industry
overhaul. Such reform must be implemented to restore credibility and
prevent regulatory arbitrages from re-emerging. In this section the
deficiencies of the rating industry are examined and a range of reform
proposals will be explored. International CRA reform may hold the key to
effective international market-based evolution of the finance industry.
B. FAILURES
At the heart of the CRAs failure to properly evaluate the subprime and
SF market were unrealistic assumptions regarding housing market price
growth. 155 CRAs did not adequately disclose their assumptions and were
slow to adjust their methodologies, holding on to unrealistic home price
appreciation estimates even once the housing market had begun its
decline.156 Furthermore, CRAs failed to acknowledge the negligent lending
occurring in the subprime market.157  The rise of highly risky alternative
retired by the time this house of cards falters." U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Summary
Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff's Examination of Select Credit Rating Agencies, 12
n.8, (July 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexaminationO708O8.pdf
("SEC").
154. lOSCO, The Role of Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 152, at 9.
155. There is information suggesting that at least one of the major CRAs was using Home Price
Appreciation assumptions of +6-8 percent for 2006, 2007, and 2008 in their ratings models for
securitizations which went to market in 2006 and the first quarter of 2007. Bass, supra note 51, at 74.
156. For example, a Fitch representative admitted to using assumption of mid-single digit home
price appreciation in a conference call on Apr. 22, 2007. This assumption was used even though Fitch's
own published home price data ".... confirms a national home price correction has been under way,
with the US median home prices down 2.7 percent." Mason, supra note 13, at 120.
157. Prior to April 2007, at least one major CRA did not gather data regarding whether a loan
was an option ARM. Mason, supra note 13, at 119.
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mortgage products was well known and should have been incorporated into
risk analysis.
CRAs also did not recognize the far higher rates of default associated
with SF products, as compared to corporate bonds. Moody's own analysis
of CDOs, rated at their lowest investment grade 158 versus corporate bonds
with the same rating, reveals that from 1993-2005, five-year default rates
were over ten times higher for CDOs.159 Shockingly, these statistics do not
include the current credit crisis which has seen and will continue to see
massive CDO defaults. It is clear that the risk of default associated with SF
products was far higher than their ratings reflected. 60 Unfortunately, these
inflated ratings were relied upon by the SF industry to operate, and the
result of this undeserved confidence was a global credit crisis.
C. RATINGS ARBITRAGE
A major source of CRA failure is that their role in the industry is to
rate bonds for issuer purposes, not investors. 161 Bond issuers have every
incentive to receive the highest rating possible as this reduces the risk
premium they pay to investors. Once sold, they cease to have risk exposure
to the bonds, so the higher initial rating they receive, the more profitable
their business. Bond investors conversely, have every incentive to see the
most conservative rating assigned to bonds to maximize returns. However,
these competing incentives did not reach equilibrium, and SF instrument
were consistently overrated. A number of factors contributed to this
disjunction. First, investors failed to undertake their own due diligence and
analysis, often relying almost entirely on ratings. A second factor, which
suggests a thoroughly dysfunctional market, is evidence that regulated
investors encouraged CRAs to understate risk to allow them to invest in a
wider range of higher yielding securities. 162 An indication of the implicit
agreement between CRAs and regulated institutional investors is that CRAs
sell tools to investors to evaluate credit risk in rated deals after
158. Id. at 114.
159. According to the study, in the period between 1983-2005, corporate bonds rated Baa
averaged a 2.2 percent default rate over five year periods. CDOs with the same rating averaged 24
percent default rates over the same period. Id.
160. It has been argued that corporate bonds and structured finance bonds should not be on the
same rating scale as corporate debt. An option which has been considered by the SEC and IOSCO is to
add an identifier to distinguish structured finance ratings from corporate bonds. Please see SEC, supra
note 153, at 5; and IOSCO, The Role of Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 152, at 16.
161. Mason, supra note 12, at 118.
162. Id. at 114.
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origination.163 Furthermore, although CRAs sold tools to measure the risks
of new products, they did not adjust their ratings methodologies to account
for the same risks.' 6  This evidence exposes the arbitrage between ratings
and the true value of investment, which was one of the major catalysts
behind the proliferation in SF.
In addition to the heavy market and regulatory reliance on ratings,
CRAs are granted extraordinary exceptions and protections in the U.S.
market and abroad. First, they are exempted by the SEC from disclosure
rules, and do not have to disclose confidential information they receive
from issuers.165 This adds value to ratings because they are presumed to have
important non-public information which informs their decisions. Second, they
are immune from liability of the Securities Act, 66 in connection with securities
offerings. This means their ratings are not even held to a negligence
standard. 67 Before the credit crisis the SEC recognized this problem and
issued the following statement regarding CRAs:
[. .. ] because the credit rating agencies are subject to little
formal regulation or oversight, and their liability traditionally
has been limited by regulatory exemptions and First Amendment
protections, there is little to hold them accountable for future
poor performance. [. .. ] It is difficult not to wonder whether
lack of accountability-the agencies' practical immunity to
lawsuits and non-existent regulatory oversight-is a major
problem."' 68
A final factor absolving CRAs from any accountability is that they
take no responsibility for the accuracy of the information on which their
ratings are based. 69 CRAs play the role of professionals and are
163. According to Mason this allows CRAs to .. . effectively profit from selling one product to
arbitrage regulatory requirements and another product to sort out the difference." Mason, supra note
13, at 115.
164. Id. at 118.
165. The SEC has exempted NRSROs from Regulation F-D. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §
243. 100(b)(2)(iii) (2008).
166. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2007) ("Securities Act").
167. Whitehead, supra note 32, at 135.
168. Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating
Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets 4 (January 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov
/news/studies/credratingreportO I 03.pdf.
169. For example, Moody's Investor Service, Code of Professional Conduct states: "MIS has no
obligation to perform, and does not perform, due diligence with respect to the accuracy of information it
receives or obtains in connection with the rating process. MIS does not independently verify any such
information. Nor does MIS audit or otherwise undertake to determine that such information is
complete. Thus, in assigning a Credit Rating, MIS is in no way providing a guarantee or any kind of
assurance with regard to the accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of factual information reflected or
contained, in the Credit Rating or any related MIS publication." Moody's Investors Service, Code of
Professional Conduct 8 (October 2007), available at http://www.moodys.com (follow "Code of




compensated as such. It follows that their "opinions" should be accorded
the same responsibilities and should be held liable for professional
negligence. The illusory treatment of ratings as mere opinions and
"freedom of speech" defenses which accompanies such classification do
not reflect the true role of ratings in the market. Clearly, the fact that
ratings are required and relied upon elevates their work from that of a
editorialist. It is difficult to fathom how so much reliance was placed on
organizations who have a disclaimer with regards to their responsibility,
and are not held accountable for their ratings.
D. RATINGS SHOPPING
The nature of the rating industry allows issuers to choose whether or
not to have a rating published. This gives them a great deal of power and
leverage in the rating process. Once a CRA has reviewed all relevant
information and come to a final rating decision, they notify the issuer. The
issuer then decides whether to accept the rating and make it public." 0 CRAs
are usually only paid if a rating is issued. 71 Although there may be a break-
up fee applicable, once a final decision is made, the agency has great
incentive to ensure a rating is issued and they are paid. SF issuers often
request that CRAs provide prospective assessments on CDOs before
deciding which CRA to hire 72 and as a result issuers are able to "ratings
shop," or only accept the most favorable ratings. This is an obvious
conflict of interest; encouraging CRAs to provide the high ratings in order
to gain business. According to an IOSCO report, some CRAs rapidly lost
market shares (for rating commercial mortgage backed securities) when
they employed more conservative assumptions in reaction to the turmoil of
the market. 73 The market thus punishes CRAs for adopting realistic
assumptions. A traditional deterrent to rating shopping is the issuance of
unsolicited ratings. However, because of lack of public information
regarding SF products, unsolicited ratings of CDOs are rare.174
In response to this phenomena, Andrew Cuomo, New York's Attorney
General has proposed that rating agencies charge for their work, even if
they are not chosen to rate the deal.' 5 The IOSCO has also recommended
measures to combat ratings shopping, including encouraging SF issuers to
170. IOSCO, supra note 28, at 22.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 28.
173. Id. at 28-29.
174. IOSCO, The Role of Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 152, at 8.
175. Aline van Duyn & Joanna Chung, Rating Agencies Agree to Change Charges, FINANCIAL
TIMES, (June 4, 2008), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4f88b3ae-31bf-l 1dd-b77c-
0000779fd2ac.html.
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publicly disclose all relevant information, so investors and other CRAs can
conduct their own independent analysis.1 76 A related measure is requiring
rating agencies to publicly disclose whether an issuer of a SF product has
made public all relevant information about the product being issued. 77 As
a minimum, clear disclosure of the how the CRA which provided a given
rating is compensated, should be mandatory.
These proposals aimed at the lack of transparency afflicting the ratings
industry likely do not go far enough. Although rating agency models are
available to investors, they are of little use without detailed information
regarding the underlying assets and rating agency's assumptions. Disclose
of all information CRAs have been provided with, in a detailed and
reasonable format must be demanded. Furthermore, details of their
methodologies and assumptions should be disclosed to the public, as well
as their ratings track record. CRAs are resistant to publish verifiable
historical performance data regarding their ratings claiming that a common
metric is undesirable because they employ different methods, and this
would push them toward common methodologies. 178 This is testament to
the lack of competitive forces in the ratings industry. Typically a
company's achievement is its primary source of marketing, and they strive
to differentiate their performance from the competition. The IOSCO has
recommended CRAs:
[...] publish verifiable, quantifiable historical information about
the performance of its rating opinions, organized and structured,
and, where possible, standardized in such a way to assist
investors in drawing performance comparisons between different
CRAs. 179
The SEC has also proposed CRAs publish performance statistics for
one, three, and ten years for each rating category, to facilitate comparisons
with competitors.' 8  In order to have a functioning market, participants
should be given information allowing them to determine the informational
value of ratings. The resistance to provide such information on the part of
the CRAs speaks volumes as to their worth.
E. REGULATORY REFORM
Given the tremendous influence afforded to CRAs, the feeble IOSCO
176. IOSCO, The Role of Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 152, at app. A, 8 (Provision 2.8(c)).
177. Id. at 15.
178. Id. at 9.




voluntary code of conduct which governs them seems totally inadequate. 181
Both the SEC and EU are taking steps to invoke stricter regulation given
the failures of the self-regulatory approach. 182 In the U.S. the Credit Rating
Reform Act 183 has brought CRAs under supervision of the SEC, requiring
their registration; it is likely Europe will follow suit. The SEC has
contemplated requiring rating agencies to produce a report outlining how
each rating is assigned and any possible adverse consequences.
A number of other fundamental changes to the industry have also been
proposed. The IOSCO's Code of Conduct for Rating Agencies has
included a provision prohibiting rating agencies from providing structuring
or advisory services for transactions they subsequently rate. 84 This would
be a major blow to the revenue streams of CRAs, which rely increasingly
on this function. However, allowing CRAs to be the judge of their own
creations has had devastating effects on the market. It is highly likely that
a more conservative rating would have been assigned to SF if CRAs were
not involved in their design.
Another option is to stop basing investment restrictions and capital
measurements on ratings. Investment grade regulations for institutional
investors have continually led to market manipulation, with growth of
CDOs largely attributable to these investment restrictions. The SEC has
proposed allowing money market funds to invest in short-term debt without
regard for ratings. 85 Generally, the removal of ratings-based rules could
prevent the regulatory arbitrages achieved through ratings.186  One method
mentioned would be for regulators to stop using letter grades when setting
standards for permissible investments by regulated institutions. This would
force banks and their regulators to examine underlying investments and not
defer to CRA evaluations. With regards to capital changes, there is
growing international sentiment that there be less reliance on ratings, and it
would not be surprising to see Basel II move away from their use. For the
CRA industry to continue in its current form, changes in their regulation
will be necessary. However, as discussed below, more pervasive reform
may offer an opportunity to improve the mechanisms of the SF industry as
a whole.
181. CRAs are guided by the IOSCO's Code of Conduct for rating agencies.
182. Tony Barber, EU Turns Up Heat on Rating Agencies, FINANCIAL TIMES, (July 7, 2008),
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a647dd5a-4c40- 11 dd-96bb-000077b07658.html?nclick check- 1.
183. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-29, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006).
184. IOSCO, The Role of Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 152, at app. A, 7 (Provision 1.14-I A).
185. Jesse Westbrook, SEC Ratings Probe Reveals Conflicts in Grading Debt, BLOOMBERG, July
8, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=ajhoEOoJHZuY
186. In the short term, eliminating forced selling rules would have the practical advantage of
preventing a downward price spiral where a ratings downgrade leads to a glut of unwanted securities in
the market place.
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F. COMPETITION
The credit rating industry is a state-sanctioned global monopoly. The
U.S. government's granting of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organization ("NRSRO") status to S&P, Moody's and Fitch allowed these
firms to become de facto regulators of SF. Impediments to entering the
market have allowed these leading CRAs to dominate the global rating
industry. To break this monopoly, the requirement that rating agencies be
NRSROs should be removed and the marketplace allowed to determine
which rating agencies are credible. CRAs collective ratings records are
testament to the fact their success was not due to the accuracy of their
ratings, but rather their implications. In a true market system reputation is
determined based on track record, not a statutory designation. An example
of the absence of market forces in the ratings industry is that the typical
penalty for failure is loss of business. However, issuers must have at least
one rating from a recognized CRA to sell their products, and therefore
cannot take their business elsewhere. To improve competition, regulatory
entry barriers should be removed and resources focused on regulating the
industry's operation. At this point any fears of incompetent CRAs
emerging and providing poor information to the market is displaced by the
lack of confidence in the ratings industry. The days of blind reliance on
CRAs are behind us. If a competitor to the big three can demonstrate a
better track record based on a common measurement, they will be rewarded
with a larger market share.
G. COLLECTIVE MODELS
A solution to ratings shopping and the undue influence exerted by
issuers on CRAs is to revert in part or in whole to the subscriber model,
where investors pay for information. The major benefit of the issuer pay
model is that ratings assigned by CRAs are freely available to investors.
Without question this system leads to a greater dissemination of
information to the market. However, if as in the case of SF, these ratings
have no informational value because of misaligned incentives or
incompetence, they are of little use. A compromise to the heavy incentives
favoring issuers in the rating system is to require agencies to derive a given
percentage of revenues from investors, 187 ensuring that the CRA and
investor interests are more closely aligned. This could be achieved by
requiring CRAs to split their business, or the state sponsored bi-furcation of
187. Sean J. Egan, Comments on the IOSCO Technical Committee Consultation Report on Credit




the industry, through the creation of a "buy side" ratings industry funded by
transaction fees on deals. An interesting suggestion raised by Sean Egan,
co-founder of Egan-Jones Ratings Co., is to require a minimum of two
ratings for SF and of those two, require that one be from a company not
compensated by the issuer of bonds.
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In the SF world, ratings are essentially mandatory and this raises the
specter of creating a system where issuers pay into an independently
managed pool, as opposed to directly to a rating agency. Pool managers
could assign one or more CRAs to rate a given deal, and this would remove
any commercial incentive to overrate securities. Although this would be
the greatest departure from the status quo, it has the most potential to cure
the industry and ensure objectivity. The issue with implementing this
system would be deciding which CRAs are eligible to participate, and how
to achieve a high standard of ratings. If a static group of CRAs were
selected, there is a concern that lack of competition could lead to a decline
in rating quality. This could be mitigated by setting strict standards and
allowing new CRAs to enter the pool only if they have a strong track
record. By adhering to a pooled system, with regulatory oversight, many of
the lucrative incentives, (whereby CRAs profited from industry
disincentives and ratings arbitrages) would be removed. This may lead to a
resurgence in investor side CRAs, which could play an important role in
improving industry discipline.
VI. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
The credit crisis has demonstrated just how interconnected the
international market is. We have witnessed assets originating in the U.S.
infect the global market, proving that country specific financial regulation
is becoming obsolete. There is an obvious need for an international
approach given the global nature of credit markets; regulatory reforms
enacted in response to the credit crisis cannot be done unilaterally. Without
coordinated international action, heightening regulatory standards will
likely result in capital being channeled to jurisdictions with lower
requirements. In addition to encouraging a race to the bottom, country
specific regulation creates rife opportunity for future regulatory arbitrages.
The current international framework is characterized by organizations such
as IOSCO, which lack the power to compel action, limiting their role to a
largely advisory capacity. The final section of this paper will discuss the
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A. BASEL II
The most widely implemented international regulation is the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision's international capital adequacy
standards, known as the Basel accord. As explained previously, these
standards in their original form, Basel I, encouraged regulatory arbitrage
through the creation of off-balance sheet instruments and the use of
derivatives, which were unaccounted for under that accord. Basel II, was
brought into force in June 2006, and has been or will be implemented by
most developed nations worldwide. It is widely believed that, had Basel II
been implemented, it would have improved the resilience and lessened the
credit crises' impact on the financial system, as it restricts the regulatory
arbitrage opportunities associated with Basel I. Pillar 1 of Basel II adopts a
more sophisticated treatment of off-balance sheet instruments, subjecting
them to capital charges more reflective of their risks. It imposes charges
when, "significant credit risk has not been transferred to a third party, the
transferor maintains effective or indirect control over the transferred
exposures, or the securities issued are obligations of the transferor,"' 89 and
this includes capital requirements for liquidity facilities and credit
enhancements. However, Basel II in its current form still contains a
number of weaknesses which contributed to the current crisis. Further
reforms are necessary to ensure that all risks associated with liquidity
facilities, including implicit support and reputation risks be properly
accounted for. Although the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is
planning to raise capital requirements on CDOs to more accurately reflect
their susceptibility to systemic market weakness, 190 a more sophisticated
approach to creating capital changes for derivatives and clearer guidelines
to their implementation is also necessary.
Another weakness of, Basel II is the fact that it does not apply to all
important financial institutions. Reforms must apply to investment banks,
and this is essential to ensure the financial system is adequately capitalized.
There is also an over-reliance on CRA ratings and internal risk
management models, both of which failed to predict the current financial
crisis. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is concern that Basel II
will have a pro-cyclical effect on the market, worsening economic
downturns by forcing firms to restrict lending practices, while encouraging
credit booms in positive economic cycles.191  These shortcomings are
189. Basel II, supra note 133, at 554.
190. FSF, supra note 102, at 14.
191. According to Roubini, even before being fully implemented, the Basel 11 agreement has
shown its serious flaws:
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potential hazards which must be analyzed and responded to at the
international level.
B. LIQUIDITY PROVIDER OF LAST RESORT
The threat of a global economic meltdown became apparent with the
international liquidity crunch and bank runs requiring government
intervention. The credit crisis demonstrated that liquidity can be every bit
as crucial as solvency. In order to mitigate widespread economic threats
formal international co-ordination, with respect to the provision of
liquidity, is necessary. An international burden sharing scheme involving
commitments to provide liquidity could be an effective tool to combat
major economic crisis of confidence.1 92  The development of a liquidity
lender of last resort has been proposed by Professor Schwarcz, a legal
scholar and expert in systemic risk, as a backstop against market
instability. 93  Such an entity would provide liquidity by acquiring
securities in collapsing markets at deep discounts, preventing downward
price spirals and marketplace panic. In order to mitigate moral hazards and
maintain market discipline, these purchases would be made in view of a
profit and at levels of discount which severely impair investors. Such an
institution could also adopt a policy of "constructive ambiguity" allowing
the liquidity provider discretion as to when to intervene in order to prevent
market reliance.194 The costs of funding would not necessarily have to be
borne by the public if premiums were charged or funds derived from the
private sector. Liquidity pools could be funded by charging insurance style
•4 195
"premiums" to market participants eligible to receive support. A liquidity
lender of last resort could be a governmental agency, 96 but also private
capital market participants if they were granted priority in a similar manner
to debtor-in-possession financing.' 97 An international joint governmental
agency could be charged with deciding appropriate cases to advance
funding. Although this institution would not improve the issues of market
discipline this paper has focused on, it could play a crucial role in
capital adequacy ratios that are pro-cyclical and thus inducing credit booms in good
times and credit busts in bad times; low emphasis on the importance of liquidity risk
management; excessively low capital requirements given the serious financial risks
faced by banks; excessive reliance on internal risk management models; excessive role
given to rating agencies and their ratings.
Roubini, supra note 118, at 5.
192. C.A.E. Goodhart, The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, CESIFO Working Paper
No. 2257, (March 2008), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_2257.html ("Goodhart").
193. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 125, at 15.
194. Id. at 45.
195. Id. at 46.
196. For example, the IMF or one or more national central banks. Id. at 75.
197. Id. at 47.
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preventing market panic and avoiding the systemic meltdowns which
threaten the new global economy.
C. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RATING AGENCY
In addition to a liquidity provider of last resort, there is a need for the
formation of an organization to provide oversight of international credit
issues. The structure and source of sanction for such an organization will
be difficult to establish but in the wake of the global credit crisis,
international support has an opportunity to be garnered. The creation of a
multilateral treaty to develop a regulatory framework, could provide the
power which has thus far been lacking in the international financial market.
The development of an international credit rating agency may be the
answer. The failures of CRAs are well publicized and central to the current
financial crisis. They were granted a huge degree of regulatory power in
the international market, and in the wake of their failures it is clear this
power was undeserved. What is also clear is that in the current financial
system, credit ratings have a great deal more influence on the international
market than any regulatory regime. The power of ratings could provide a
market-based source of inter-governmental control that regulatory
initiatives hereto have lacked. The nature of such an organization would
represent a sui generis and clearly no international agency could ever have
the capacity to replace the thousands of people employed by rating
agencies. However, it could play an influential role, monitoring
information received by rating agencies for systemic threats, and offering
ratings guidance and instruction to CRAs. It is not difficult to conceive of
such an organization pre-empting the subprime crisis by monitoring the
market. It could have instructed CRAs to adopt more reasonable home
price appreciation assumptions and take into account the rash of new and
risky lending products, as well as issued cautionary guidance on complex
financial instruments. Working in the capacity of an international rating
agency, such an organization would be in a position to oversee the industry,
the companies they rate and economic trends. This organization would be
charged with issuing public recommendations as well as instructing rating
agencies regarding their methodologies. Having the power to influence
ratings would give such an organization far more sanction than current
international organizations, which act mostly as commentators. This is a
true market solution to a system which is currently not based on market
forces, but rather regulatory advantage.
In terms of the technical feasibility of such an organization, the CRA
reforms discussed in this paper could play a role. The international
adoption of a pool based fee system for CRAs could be used in part to fund
such an organization. Under this system issuers would not pay rating
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agencies directly. Rather, the cost of ratings would be contributed to a
pool. From this pool the international organization could also be funded by
way of a percentage contribution on each rated deal. While the prospect of
developing an international securities regulator has been shunned as
unrealistic, this would be a market based system which would not require
the sacrifice of state regulatory power.
The events of the past year demonstrate the need for an international
financial monitor with sanction. It is highly unlikely that an objective
international agency overseeing the ratings industry would have allowed
the unrealistic ratings which plagued the market, and contributed to the
current crisis.
VII. CONCLUSION
The mantra of capitalism has always been that of minimal state
intervention with proponents preaching deregulation. However, state
inaction in the face of a historic real estate bubble and dysfunction financial
system contributed to a major global crisis. Now as we witness wide-scale
government bailouts, it is clear more regulation is necessary across the
globe. Private firms demonstrated a total lack of discipline in boom times
and when the consequences of their actions were manifest, governments
intervened with public money to bail them out. This is unacceptable on a
number of levels, but what is most reprehensible is that it allows the
wealthy to prosper at the expense of the everyday tax payer. The role of
the state has been a patsy for private industry, providing only advantageous
legislation and protections, coming to the aid of opportunistic undisciplined
firms when the going gets tough. Without reform it will not be long before
another crisis strikes. At the moment we are in the midst of a steep
increase in commodity prices, due in part to the lowering of interest rates,
in response to the credit crisis and speculation through derivative markets.
There is a strong case to be made for the adoption of more contra-cyclical
policies to prevent asset bubbles and the misfeasance which often
accompanies them. In the future this could take the form of requiring
additional capital and liquidity in periods of bubble growth and relaxing
these requirements in periods of contraction.
98
Whether the financial crisis is nearing an end or has just begun, its
lessons must not be lost. The blind pursuit of profits at all cost may
provide temporary periods of economic expansion but these do not last, and
their benefits can disappear in the blink of an eye. A global collective re-
thinking of our economic goals must be undertaken and hopefully more
198. Goodhart, supra note 192, at 10.
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sustainable policies which do not facilitate greed, will be the result. We
have entered a new and complex economic era which offers benefits, but
these can only be harvested through a more disciplined and responsible
approach to finance.
